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Abstract 
When Kleene extended his recursive realizability interpretation from intuitionistic arithmetic 
to analysis, he was forced to use more than recursive functions to interpret sequences and 
conditional constructions. In fact, he used what classically appears to be the full continuum. We 
describe here a generalization to higher type of Kleene’s realizability, one case of which, (U, R)- 
realizability, uses general recursive functions throughout, both to realize theorems and to 
interpret choice sequences. (U, R)-realizability validates a version of the bar theorem and the 
usual continuity principles, while also providing naturally, as Kleene’s 1965 realizability does 
not, for versions of lawless sequence axioms, as well as of Church’s Thesis. 
1. Introduction 
Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis includes a theory of “spreads” and “choice 
sequences” which has suggested several different formal systems and corresponding 
interpretations. These systems contain exotic axioms, including some that contradict 
classical logic. But not all the exotica can be allowed at once, since some contradict 
others. 
Earliest successful formulations, Kleene-Vesley [ 111 (cited hereafter as FIM) and 
Kreisel-Troelstra [lS], allowed for (i) bar induction, Section 7 below, and (ii) the 
so-called Y LY 3 fi-continuity or “Brouwer’s principle for functions” (Kleene), Sections 8 
and 9, and could be extended consistently to include versions of Church’s Thesis (CT), 
Section 12. 
The most recent formulations have followed one or another of two main threads, 
providing either a recursive realizability interpretation, or a topological interpreta- 
tion. The first thread follows Kleene’s FIM, with the latest treatment from 
Moschovakis [16]; the second follows Scott [19], and the last word here is 
Troelstra-van Dalen [22, Ch. 151 (which in a sense incorporates the interpretation of 
* E-mail: mthrev@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu. 
0168-0072/96/$15.00 0 1996- Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved 
SSDI 0 168-0072 (94\00047V6 
26 R.E. VesleylAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 81 (1996) 25-74 
Kreisel-Troelstra [15]). Roughly, we might say the former quest emphasizes using 
recursive functions (under CT) to interpret the intuitionistically crucial notion 
of construction; the latter quest emphasizes certain topological structures as a 
metaphor for the equally crucial intuitionistic notion of time (or of stages in a con- 
struction, etc.). 
A strength of the realizability approach is that it works with the sharp notion of 
construction provided by CT. Nonadherents of CT, including some intuitionists, may 
have doubts, but even they will grant the advantage “for technical work” of the sharp 
notion. 
On the other hand, the topological approach, uncommitted generally to CT, has 
been the field of most activity for some time. There has been notable success, e.g. in 
interpretations of Kripke’s schema, various portions of the nonclassical theory of 
lawless sequences, and Troelstra’s axiom of analytic data. 
A weakness of the realizability interpretation lies in its response to the question: 
“what are the choice sequences ?“. The intuitionist may read the interpretation as 
presuming choice sequences; the classical mathematician reads that they are simply 
the classical sequences of type N -+ N, while statements about them are subject to 
nonclassical truth conditions. An unsettling disjointness may be felt here, which is not 
present, or not so vividly present, in the case of the realizability interpretations of 
natural number arithmetic. Any intuitionist most likely sees both the classical con- 
tinuum and classical truth as unclear (or worse). If such is the case, the intuitionist may 
not accept realizability as a completely satisfactory “explanation” or clarification of 
choice sequences. 
Topological interpretations treat both choice sequences and truth conditions as 
different from classical counterparts, a possible gain from the intuitionistic viewpoint 
(at least if done acceptably). In Scott [19] the basic insight is to interpret he sequences 
as the continuous functions in (N + N) + (N -+ N). 
We offer here a new interpretation, a generalization to higher type of Kleene’s 
function realizability. This interpretation, as we show below, justifies new variations of 
principles from among the well-known axioms for sequences, making up systems 
SZ and S* described in Section 2. But beyond these technical gains, its primary interest 
may be its place in the development just described. Unlike previous versions of 
realizability, it treats choice sequences as objects with strong claims to constructive 
legitimacy, from either intuitionistic or classical viewpoints. In this interpretation, 
borrowing from both threads above, choice sequences are recursive continuous 
functions (or following Kleene: recursive functionals) in (N + N) --f (N -+ N), or, 
more precisely, their representing functions of type N -+ N (as in [9]) To put it 
another way, choice sequences are essentially the recursive counterparts of the 
elements in Kreisel-Troelstra’s K [IS]. And truth conditions are monitored by the 
same functions, in a way which combines features both of realizability and topological 
truth conditions. 
Under Church’s Thesis, these functions appear to give suitable interpretations of 
Brouwer’s notion of “spread laws” (cf. Cl] and other papers in the same volume). 
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From this perspective, one might say that in this paper everything is interpreted in 
terms of spreads. In FIM the spread notion played a less obvious role, though the 
importance of the spread notion was acknowledged by Kleene. Here we are following 
up on an insight of Myhill [ 171 but developing it in a different way. Others, including 
de Swart [20], have advocated the centrality of the spread notion in intuitionistic 
mathematics. 
Kreisel and Troelstra already showed that all statements in a certain strong theory 
of choice sequence could be construed as statements concerning K. The present work 
further confirms this insight, in a different way (and for a different heory). It is not just 
that statements about choice sequences are statements about K. In fact, choice 
sequences are exactly elements of K (granted CT), if truth conditions are as given in 
the new realizability. 
The reader will notice parallels with Troelstra-van Dalen [22], e.g. in the treatment 
of implication. But there are significant differences, e.g. in the interpretation of lawlike 
sequences as recursive rather than eventually constant sequences, and in the particu- 
lar statements which are validated. There are also parallels with van Dalen [3], which 
first used Beth models in interpreting intuitionistic analysis. 
Technically, we believe a striking feature of our particular mix of realizable 
principles in S2 and S* is the combination of bar theorem and Yx3/?-continuity with 
axioms for lawless sequences and (in S*) versions of Church’s Thesis. Formally, the 
lawless sequences are here an explicitly defined subspecies of the choice sequences, 
given one lawless sequence introduced as an individual constant of the system. These 
principles do not coexist easily, and we have had to accept both a version of the bar 
theorem not allowing a sequence parameter in R(z) (RBI of Section 7), and a weaken- 
ing by 1 l’s of LS3, the simplest “open data” axiom of lawless sequences (as in [21, 
2.6,(l)]). The resulting bar theorem, while weaker in the present context than Kleene’s 
standard one (by Definition 7.9), is still strong enough (when accompanied, as in S*, 
by a sufficiently strong continuity axiom) to allow Brouwer’s famous proof of the 
uniform continuity of all real functions on the unit interval, the major application 
historically of this theorem. The resulting LS3 is still strong enough to allow the 
refutation of even the weak Markov principle of Scedrov-Vesley [18], a result not 
obtainable using any previous realizability; again historically, such refutations have 
been a major application for lawless sequences. 
At the same time, SZ and S* give more prominent roles to “lawlike” sequences than 
previous realizability treatments, or at least those preceding Moschovakis [16]. Here, 
as in [16], lawlike sequences are simply recursive sequences. They are used to 
formulate appropriately bar induction, and, in S*, the scheme CONT!, supplementing 
the familiar Y’a3/Gcontinuity. Elaborating on a main theme of Myhill [17], while the 
full \JaZlfi-scheme ispresent here, just as in FIM, it is only for the Y’cr3!/3-form that we 
obtain a lawlike mapping from c1 to fl (see Section 9 and the discussion following 
Theorem 12.3). For Church’s Thesis, the version of Church’s Rule justified in [lo] is 
here not to be expected, because lawless sequences are explicitly present. But on the 
other hand, we recover strong CT consequences of 1945 realizability (see Section 12) 
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which were previously unavailable in function realizability. For example, we can find 
a number-theoretic formula lVx(A(x) v 1 A(x)) which turns out realizable, as in 
Kleene’s 1945 realizability but not in the form of his function realizability validating 
intuitionistic analysis (Theorem 12.4). 
More speculative is the bearing of this work on the search for a so-called 
“projections model” for choice sequences. Myhill [17] (following Kreisel) stated 
powerfully the case for seeking an interpretation of choice sequences in terms of 
the notions of lawless and lawlike sequences. But van Dalen and Troelstra [4] 
showed that one direct approach interpreting choice sequences as given by lawlike 
projections of lawless functions would not work. Much recent work by van der 
Hoeven, beginning with [SJ, has explored related possibilities; see also [21, 
Ch. 43. The present interpretation raises the spectre of this old explanation, from 
its death at the hands of van Dalen-Troelstra. That explanation may yet be seen 
to be coherent, provided the logic is similarly explained (via realizability interpreta- 
tion) on lawlike projection of lawless sequences. The issue is partly to what 
extent we can interpret the domain U used below as consisting of just the 
(informal) lawless sequences. See 13.2. And for the current views on this of Kreisel, 
see [14]. 
An early version of the lawless sequences part of this work was privately circulated 
in 1981; versions for choice sequences were presented at logic seminars in Buffalo, 
most recently in 1988. It owes much to all of the people named above, especially 
Kleene and Myhill, and to others, including Nicolas Goodman, a colleague ever 
skeptical about choice sequences. 
Some open problems are discussed in Section 13. 
2. The formal systems S1, S2 and S * 
2.1. We start from the formal system FIM for intuitionistic analysis and consider 
some modifications. 
Let L be the language of FIM, but with -+ , A replacing 3 , &. L includes variables 
x1, . . . , x, for numbers and al, . . . , 01, for sequences, the constant 0, the predicate 
symbol = , a finite list of symbols for certain fixed primitive recursive functions of 
numbers and sequences, including ‘, + , and . for natural numbers, and an abstraction 
operator J.. Axioms of FIM begin with those of the intuitionistic predicate calculus, as 
in [S] but now extended to include the sequence variables, axioms for natural number 
arithmetic, axioms defining the selected primitive recursive function constants, the 
A axiom 
(“0.1) (Ixr(x))(t) = r(t), for terms r(x) and t, with t free for x in r(x), 
an equality axiom for sequences 
(“1.1) x = y + a(x) = a(y), and an axiom of choice 
(“2.1) Vx3aA(x, CI) + 3/?VxA(x, Ay/3(2”3Y)). 
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The most interesting axioms of FIM are then given by the schemes of bar induction 
and of continuity (Kleene’s “26.3 and “27.1), which will be discussed in detail below. 
Language L* is obtained from L by adding a primitive constant functor (function of 
one variable) o, representing a particular “lawless” sequence. In L*, arbitrary lawless 
sequences will be represented by an explicit formula (Section 10). 
Below we shall be concerned primarily with three formal systems: 
S1: the system with language L* and all the axioms and rules of FIM, applied to 
formulas of L*, except that the bar induction and continuity schemes are omitted. 
Sa: the system Si with the following additional axiom schemes. 
(i) The bar induction scheme (RBI in Section 7), restricted so R not contain w, and so 
R contain sequence parameters only if these are specified to represent lawlike (recur- 
sive) sequences. (This permits BI in the form of Kleene’s “26.3b with lawlike p.) 
(ii) The usual Va3/3-continuity CONT (Kleene’s “Brouwer’s principle for functions” 
“27.1) without restriction (Section 8). 
(iii) The scheme WCONT!, asserting from hypothesis V’cl3!/IA(a, /I), the weak exist- 
ence (i.e., -11 3) of a lawlike map from c( to p, in contrast to FIM’s VU~/?-continuity 
CONT, which gives existence of a map of no particular pedigree (Section 9) 
(iv) Two axiom schemes for lawless sequences, LS3 and LS4, the other two LSl-LS2 
of the usual four being provable (Section 10). 
S*: the system SZ with the further axiom scheme: ‘Jag! /?-continuity or CONT! 
(Section 9), which asserts from closed hypothesis V’rZl!fiA(a, ,!?) the existence of 
a lawlike map from c( to fl such that A(a, /3). 
We shall consider briefly also FIMN, which is the system FIM (in original language 
L) with the bar induction scheme formulated so that the “barring predicate” R is 
restricted to be without sequence parameters (bar induction in form BIN; see Section 
7). We observe in Corollary 11.2 and Section 11.4 that already for this system the 
realizability interpretation to be described in Section 3 justifies enough “lawlessness” 
to show unprovable even a weak version of Markov’s principle. 
2.2. In Section 3 below we define our realizability notion, (U, H)-realizability, for 
formulas of L*. In Section 4 we show that this realizability reduces for a certain choice 
of H, H = Co, to the function realizability of Kleene in FIM. In Section 5 we show 
that all theorems of S, are (U, H)-realizable, for any recursively closed H, including 
for example 
H = R = {recursive functions in N + N} and 
H = C = {arbitrary functions in N --f N}, 
and that this property is preserved under the addition of new realizable axioms 
(Theorem 5.4). 
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In Sections 7- 10, we establish the (U, H)-realizability, for any recursively closed H, 
of all but one of the remaining axiom schemes included in Sz, specifically of 
RBI, CONT, LS3-LS4. We establish the (U, Qrealizability of the remaining 
one, WCONT!. Thus, in particular, all theorems of SZ are (U, R)-realizable 
(Theorem 10.8). 
In Section 7, we see that the restrictions placed on bar induction in RBI are 
necessary for the establishment of (U, R)-realizability. We see also that for Kleene’s 
system FIM the replacement of Kleene’s bar induction scheme “26.3 with BIN is 
a weakening of the system. 
All these arguments are constructive, and we have a constructively acceptable 
interpretation in the recursive functions of a theory of choice sequences including 
lawless ones. We show in Section 11 that the lawless axioms are sufficiently strong to 
reject even a weak version of Markov’s principle. 
In Section 9, we use a nonconstructive argument o show the (U, @-realizability of 
the additional axiom scheme CONT! included in S*. Hence all theorems of S* are 
(U, R)-realizable (Theorem 10.9). CONT! also provides versions of Church’s Thesis 
(Section 12). 
3. (U, H)-realizability 
3.1. Basic to a realizability interpretation of analysis are codes of continuous func- 
tions. Let C = {8)8:N + N}. Kleene introduced the notion of a function E in 
C coding a continuous function F from C to C in the following way [9 or FIM, 
p. 911. Letting 8 and fi range over C, E codes the function F which takes input 8 to 
output /? if 
(i) (Vx)(3!y)s(2”” *e(y)) > 0, and 
(ii) (‘v’x)(F (O)(x) = j?(x) = ~(2~+’ * &yJ) 2 1) where y, = pye(2”+’ * 8(y)) > 0. 
Kleene introduced (E} [IS] as notation for AxE(~~+~ * f?( yJ) A l), considered as partial 
recursive function of E and 8. We use here also a/0. Following Kleene, E/e is properly 
dejined if(i) holds. 
Let U be the tree whose nodes are the finite sequences of natural numbers (Kleene’s 
“universal spread” of FIM), with partial ordering given by inclusion (as initial 
segment of the sequence). A branch 8 of U corresponds in the usual way to a 
function 8: N + N, i.e. to 8 in C, when nodes are coded by sequence numbers so that 
as usual 
u = @(lb(u)) = I<Fc”, pj’+ = n plfcif+‘. 
i<lh(u) 
The number 1 encodes the empty sequence, or initial node of the tree. We write 8 E u, 
for u a node on U, if u = @(lb(u)). We write u c v (or u c u) if u and v are sequence 
numbers and the sequence encoded by u is an initial segment (or proper initial 
segment) of the sequence ncoded by u. 
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Suppose u is a node on U so that for all 0 E u, (i) holds; in this case we say E is 
u-proper. 
We describe next a way of interpreting formulas in the language L* “over the tree 
U in set H (of number-theoretic functions)“. We call this notion: (U, H)-realizability, 
or realizability in U and H. For the initial Definitions 3.3 and 3.6, H is unspecified, but 
for later results (except in Section 4) H will be recursively closed (Definition 3.9). Two 
examples of such H, as mentioned in 2.2, are H = C and H = R. Special interest 
attaches to the case H = R for the reasons given in the introduction. 
Although other possible choice of U than the universal spread are certainly 
possible, we shall not consider any other choice, except in the remark in 4.7. See 
also 13.3. 
3.2. Definition. Let t be a term or g a functor (notation for one-place function) or 
A a formula of L*. An H-assignment, or simply an assignment, for t or g or A 
is a finite list Y of functions from H, including one correlated to each free 
number or function variable of t or g or A. An assignment is u-suitable, for u a se- 
quence number, if 
(i) for each $ in the list Y, II/ is u-proper, and 
(ii) for each $ assigned to a number variable and each 0 E u, cC//O is a constant 
function (of type N -+ N; that is, for the fixed 0 and any n, ($/Q(n) = ($/e)(O)). 
We specify through definitions below for an arbitrary term t or functor g, the 
interpretation 1 tly or Igl’ under assignment Y. This interpretation is obtained in 
Definition 3.6 using Kleene’s /i of FIM. If $ [ Y, 01 is partial recursive with values in 
C, then n01++[Y, e] is a primitive recursive function of Y such that when properly 
defined: (&I $ [ Y, 0])/0 = $ [Y, 0-J. (We follow Kleene’s convention of distinguishing 
functions with values in C, or “functionals”, from functions with values in N by writing 
I++ [ ] or $ ( ), respectively). 
We might expect a closed term of the formal system to be interpreted under an 
assignment as a natural number, and a closed functor as a function from N to N. 
Taking a classical point of view, this is what we shall have “in the end”, but only 
when we have first fixed upon a particular branch 0 of the underlying tree (and 
in doing this, using the completed infinity of the classical mathematician). 
Under a given u-suitable assignment Y, a term will yield on each branch 8 E u 
a natural number, but possibly different natural numbers on different branches. 
So for each u-suitable assignment Y a term will be interpreted “globally” as a 
function of 0 E u yielding natural number values. Similarly for each u-suitable 
assignment a functor will be interpreted as a function of 0 E u yielding values 
which are functions in C. In fact, it is convenient to allow, as we have done 
above, assignments for both function variables and number variables to be functions 
in C + C. Then on a given branch under a given u-suitable Y, both terms and 
functors will yield functions a in C, and for terms we obtain finally a(O) as number 
value. 
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This will now be made precise in two definitions. Viewed classically, the first 
gives the “local interpretation” qt or ‘ps of term t or functor g on fixed branch 8, 
using a list of values for variables which should be seen as obtained by evaluating 
a u-suitable “global assignment” Y along the branch 19. The second Definition 3.4 
gives then the “global interpretation” 1 t1’ or 1 g 1’ encompassing all “local interpreta- 
tions”. 
In general, we shall not distinguish notationally the assignment from the formal 
variables but rely on context for the distinction. Thus for example, we may write that 
assignment clO, .. . , a, is correlated to variables CI~, . .. , a,,,. 
3.3. Definition. For each term t, or functor g, letting m and II be the number of distinct 
function and number variables occurring free in t, or g, we define by induction, for 
each p > m, q > n, a general recursive function cp~Pq (Y, e), or general recursive func- 
tional (P~P’~ [Y, 01, where the list Y of p + q arguments consists of p arguments from C, 
including one correlated to each of the m function variables, and q arguments from N, 
including one correlated to each of the n number variables, and 0 is an additional 
argument from C. 
1. If t is xi: (PP’~(Y, 0) = Xi (i.e. the number in Y correlated to variable Xi). 
2. If g is ai: (pi*4 [Y, 01 = tli (the function in Y correlated to variable Mi). 
3. If t is 0: (P/*~(Y, 0) = 0. 
4. If g is 0: (p;vq[Y, e] = 8. 
5. If t is A(g, s) where g is a list go, . . . , gh and s is so, . . . , sk then 
(PP~Y, 0) =f(4o;,qrY, 03, . . . , (P:;~( Y, e)), where f is the intended interpretation of A. 
6. If g is h, i.e. any constant functor, qrq [Y, 01 =f, the intended interpretation of 
J;:. In particular, if g is ’ c~,P.~[Y, O] = ’ = lxx + 1. 
7. If t is g(s): cppsq(Y, e) = (cp;q[Y, e])(g,yY, e)). 
8. If g is Axit: cp,“sq[Y, e] = Lxq, p*q+ 1(Y x, f3), where Y, x is an assignment for , 
t extending the assignment Y for r&it, with x assigned to xi. 
3.4. Lemma. (i) Suppose t is a term containing free m function variables and n number 
variables, and suppose p, p1 > m and q, q1 B n. Suppose cpp’“( Y, g) and CJ$“‘~~( Y1, 0) are 
de$ned as in Dejinition 3.3. Suppose for each number and function variable 
of t the value correlated to that variable in Y is equal to the value correlated in Y1. 
Then: 
(P~(Y, e) = (P~I(Y~, e). 
(ii) Similarly, for g a functor: cpFq[Y, e] = (~;1*~1 [Y,, e]. 
3.5. Lemma. (i) Suppose t is a term containing free m function variables and n number 
variables but not containing co. Then the value of cpp’“( Y, (3) does not depend on 8; there 
is a function q*(Y) so for all Y, 8: q,(Y) = (P/*~(Y, e). 
(ii) Similarly, if g is a functor not containing w there is a functional ‘ps [Y] so that 
for all Y, 8: cp,[Y] = ~p,p.~[Y, e]. 
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We can now define the interpretations 1 tl’ or lgly (sometimes written I tJ [Y] or 
lg( [Y]) of t or g under an H-assignment Y. Although below we will be interested in 
using such interpretations only when the H-assignment is u-suitable for some 
sequence number U, we can nevertheless make Definition 3.6 independent of any such 
special assumptions about the assignment. 
In this definition and subsequently we shall use the following natural abbreviations. 
If Y is a list $o, . . . . $, of functions, then Y/6’ is the list of partial functions 
*,ie, . . . . tj,,,/e (functions of 8 with values, when properly defined, in C) and (Y/e)(O) 
is the list of partial functions (tie/@(O), .. . , ($,/e)(O) (functions of 8 with values, when 
defined, in N). 
3.6. Definition. Suppose t is a term containing free m distinct function variables and 
n distinct number variables. Suppose Y is an H-assignment for t which correlates 
Q1 = CI~, . .. , CI,_ 1 to function variables of t and 2 - to, . . . , (,_ 1 to number vari- -1 - 
ables of t. 
(i) The interpretation I tjy of t under assignment Y is 
Itly = nenycp,"+'."(~l/e,(~"l/e)(0),e). 
(ii) Similarly, lg\‘= necp,"fl'n[Qi,/e,(~",/e)(0),e]. 
If& Y,@l, E1 are as in Definition 3.6, then by Lemma 3.4, if Y consists of a list @ of 
p > m functions in C, where @ includes Q1, and a list Z of q > n numbers in N, where 
B includes 3 -17 then: Itly = Aely ~pp~~(@/e,(E/e)(O),e). And similarly, 
lgly = ne(p,P,q[~/e,(~/e)(o),e]. 
Without ambiguity we may write ItI’ = AeAy qt(@/8, (E/e)(O), 0) in place of 
ne~ycpp,q(~/e,(b/e)(o),e) or JgIy = /iecP,p/e,(z/e)(0),e] in place 0f 
/ie (pgPVq [Q/e, (%/e)(O), e], since p, q can be recovered from the lists of arguments. 
By Lemma 3.5, if t does not contain w then jtly = Aeily(p,(Y/& (Z/e)(O)), for 
a certain general recursive (Pi, and similarly if g does not contain w then 
1gI’ = nely cp,[Yje, (E/@(O)], for a certain general recursive qps. 
Note also that I WI = 10 1’ = &I 0, for any Y. We will occasionally find it convenient 
to use w also in the metalanguage as short for Iw I. 
The following lemma will be used below in treating the A-axiom in Theorem 5.4 
(Case “0.1). 
3.7. Lemma. Suppose s is a term or g is a functor, t is a term free for Xi in s or g, and s(t) 
or g(t) are the results of replacing Xi with t in s or g. Let cps(X, x, 8), cpsCtI(Y, 0) and 
cp,( Y, 0) be defined as in Dejnition 3.3, where Y is a list including values correlated to 
formal variables of t and s, and X, x is a list agreeing with Y in values correlated to 
formal variables of s, and with x correlated to Xi. Similarly for ‘psCx, [X, x, 01, 
qsct, CY, 4. Then 
Cody, 0) = c~,(x CP,(Y, oh oh CP~~~,CY~ 01 = dx, CP~(Y, oh a 
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Proof. Induction on the definition of s or g, using Definition 3.3. 0 
3.8. Definition. A set H of number theoretic functions is a U-domain for L* if 
(i) for every term t of L* and every u E U: if Y = @, E is a u-suitable H-assignment 
for t, then It(lY = /iQLyq~~(@/8,Z/f9(0), 19)is in H, is u-proper and is constant for fixed 
0 E u, i.e. for all n: Itl’/e(n) = 1 t/‘/e(O). 
(ii) for every functor g of L* and every u E U: if Y = @, 8 is a u-suitable 
H-assignment for g, then Ig(’ = /iOqo,[@/e, a/6’ (0), 01 is in H and is u-proper. 
The interpretations 1t 1’ or (gl’ are primitive recursive functionals of Y, and Y are 
functions in H. So the following more general condition insures that assignments from 
H give interpretations in H. 
3.9. Definition. H is recursively closed if H includes R and for every general recursive 
functional q [al, . . . , a,] of n function arguments and for every II functions $i, . . . , t+b, 
in H, the value cp [$, . . . , I),,] is in H. 
Both H = R and H = C are recursively closed and are U-domains for L*. 
A special case, to be considered in Section 4, arises when we consider the language 
L of FIM, i.e. L* without w. Then, by the remark following Definition 3.6, the 
interpretations of terms and functors are of form &)1yq(@/8, s/e(O)) and 
n0cp [Q/0, E/e(O)] for @, B in H. 
3.10. Definition. A set H of number theoretic functions is a U-domain for L if 
(i) for every term t of L and every u E U: if Y = @, 8 is a u-suitable H-assignment 
for t, then Italy = AIycp,(@/8,Z/0(0)) . IS in H, is u-proper and is constant for fixed 
eE u. 
(ii) for every functor g of L and every u E U: if Y = @, H is a u-suitable 
H-assignment for g, then lgl’ = ABq, [Q/e, E/e(O)] is in H and is u-proper. 
Examples of U-domains for L are the U-domains for L* and also R,, = [the 
U-constant one-place recursive functions] = {neflf a one-place recursive function}, 
C,, = [the U-constant one-place number-theoretic functions] = {nef[S a one-place 
number theoretic function}. 
If H is either of these examples then H does not contain R, and H is not recursively 
closed. There are recursive functions which are not U-constant; one example is 
lo1 = /lee. 
In FIM m-tuples (/IO, . . . , Pm) of functions in N + N are encoded in a single function 
a so pi = (Cr)i = /2y(a(y))i. Similarly, it is convenient to code m-tuples of functions 
intended as codes of continuous functions in C + C, as follows. 
3.11. Definition. For E in N + N and i in N: [&Ii = ne(.~@)~ = _401y((s/8)(y))i. 
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If E is in recursively closed H, then [Eli is also. If E is in R0 or Co then [Eli is also in 
R0 or Co, respectively. 
We write (a,b) for 2”3’ and (01,p) for ny(cl(y),fl(y)). Then ((tl,/?>),, = Ay 
CI (y) = a, etc. 
In the realizability notion defined in Definition 3.14 we use realizing objects 
E which, like our assignments for variables, are functions in C; in fact, as sufficed for 
the interpretations of terms and functors, these functions may come from an arbitrary 
recursively closed set H (for the case of language L*). 
Definitions 3.12, 3.14 and 3.16 are written to apply either to formulas in the 
language L*, with H recursively closed, or to formulas in L, with H = R0 or C,. The 
first application is our primary concern; the second will appear in Section 4, where 
only the definitions and not the succeeding lemmas are needed. The proofs given for 
the lemmas, and all subsequent results, except in Section 4, are for the L* case. 
We define truth of a prime formula s1 = s2 at a node u of U in, or relative to, H. 
3.12. Definition. Suppose s1 and s2 are terms of L*, and H is recursively closed. [Or: 
suppose s1 and s2 are terms of L, and H is R0 or C,.] Let ZJ be a node of U, and let Y be 
a u-suitable assignment from H for s1 and for s2. 
(a) s1 = s2 is u-true-Y in U and H if for all branches 0 of U with 0 E u: 
(Is1 I’/@(O) = (IsZl’l@(O). 
(b) s1 = s2 is u-verified-Y in U and H, if there are sequence numbers z1 G u and 
z2 E u such that: ls11’(2*z1) = Is21~(2*z2) > 0. 
Then: s1 = s2 is u-verified-Y + s1 = s2 is u-true-Y. But the converse need not hold. 
In general, only notion (b), and not (a), is decidable as predicate of u, Y. On the other 
hand, s1 = s2 is u-true-Y iff on each branch 8 of U with 8 E u there is z so 0 E z and 
s1 = s2 is z-verified-Y. 
Suppose A is an arbitrary formula in L*, u a node of U, E a function from H which is 
u-proper, and Y a u-suitable H-assignment for A. Under these conditions, we define in 
Definition 3.14 by induction on A the notion E u-realizes-Y A (in U and H), or E u-r-Y 
A (in U and H). If any of the conditions is not met, then E u-r-Y A does not hold. 
The definition parallels Kleene’s definition of FIM 8.5. As there, E is supposed to 
carry the information required to “realize” A. But whereas in FIM this means E should 
encode a function of type C + C, now E must encode a function of type 
(C -+ C) + (C -+ C) since variables already are assigned values in C + C. Along each 
branch 8 of U as we proceed further we must learn more of the map which E encodes 
and which carries partially completed values in C for the variables and/or for possible 
hypothetical constructions (as in Case 4) into partially completed values for other 
variables and/or constructions. Thus, as a preliminary to Definition 3.14 we have 
3.13. Definition. For E and CI in C: E//C! = ,40((e/@/(a/@). (In the notation of FIM, 
&l/E = ne(({&)C~l}C(CI}C~ll).) 
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3.14. Definition. Suppose A is a formula of L*, and H is recursively closed. [Or: 
suppose A is a formula of L, and H is R0 or C,.] Let u be a node on U, E be a u-proper 
function in H, and Y be a u-suitable H-assignment for A. We define by induction on A: 
E u-r-Y A, as follows. 
1. Eu-r-YsI = s2, where s1 and s2 are terms, if s1 = s2 is u-true Y. 
2. &u-r-Y B A C if [c],,u-r-Y B and [all u-r-Y C. 
3. E u-r-Y B v C if for each o in U with u c u: (i) if for all 8 E v, (s/&(O) = 0 then 
[&I1 u-r-Y B, and (ii) if for all tI E v, (s/6),(0) # 0 then [all u-r-Y C. 
4. eu-r-YB -+ Cifforeachvin Uwithu c uandforeachj?inH:ifj?v-r-YBthen 
E///I v-r-Y C. 
5. eu-r-YiB if Eu-r-YB + 1 =O. 
6(a) E u-r-Y VxB if for each v in U with u G v and each 5 in H such that Y, l is 
a u-suitable H-assignment for B with 5 assigned to x: E//C v-r-Y, ?jB. 
6(b) E u-r-Y VaB if for each u in U with u G u and each a in H such that Y, a is 
a u-suitable H-assignment for B with a assigned to a: e//a u-r-Y, aB. 
7(a) E u-r-Y 3xB if [s]r u-r-Y, [E],, B, where [cl0 is assigned to x. 
7(b) E u-r-Y 3aB if [&I1 u-r-Y, [&lo B, where [E],, is assigned to GI. 
As usual, it is left implicit that E u-r-Y A only as given by the definition. Thus for 
example Clause 4 could be amplified to: 
4. E u-r-Y B + C, where E is in H and is u-proper, and Y is a u-suitable 
H-assignment for B + C, if for each v in U with u G u and for each u-proper j? in H: if 
fi v-r-Y B then E///I v-r-Y C, where &f/b is in H and is v-proper. 
Note in Clause 3 that since E is assumed to be u-proper, it follows that for all 6’ E u, 
(E/~),(O) can be computed. On each branch 8 E u, there must be v with u G u and such 
that either for all 0 E u, (e/O),(O) = 0 or for all 0 E u, (s/e),(O) # 0. 
Also note a feature in which this definition differs essentially from Kleene’s, even 
restricted to the language L of FIM: in clause 1, “E u-r-Y A” for A prime is not in 
general decidable as predicate of E, Y even for fixed u. We cannot expect to decide 
effectively whether A is u-realized-Y because for this we must decide whether on each 
branch 8 E u there is a node u so A is v-verified-Y. 
By the next Lemma 3.15(i), for any formula A we need consider only those values in 
an assignment which are actually correlated to variables occurring in A. Then in 
3.15(ii) and subsequently we suppose asssignments to be given with correlation 
specified by the order in the list. Unless otherwise specified, we suppose such lists to be 
of form Y = @, 2, where @ is the ordered list of correlates of function variables and 
E is the ordered list of correlates of number variables. 
3.15. Lemma. Let A be a formula containing exactly the free variables Y, and let u be 
a node on U. 
(i) Suppose Y and @ are two u-suitable H-assignments for A, with Y included in @, 
both of which correlate to each variable of A the same element of Y. Then for any E in 
H: E u-r-Y A tx E u-r-@ A. 
R.E. Vesley 1 Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 81 (1996) 25- 74 37 
(ii) Suppose Ed, ~~ in H and u-proper, and suppose YI, Y2 are u-suitable H-assign- 
ments for A. Suppose for all 8 E u: sI/O = ~~16 and ‘PI/g = Y2/8. Then e1 u-r-Y1 A ifl 
E2u-r-Y2 A (where we suppose the correlation of values to variables fixed by the order in 
the list). 
Proof. By induction on A, using Definition 3.14 and Lemma 3.4. 0 
3.16. Definition. A closed formula A is (U, H)-realizable if there is a partial recursive 
functional p [O] so that Mp [O] l-r-A, for the empty assignment, or equivalently (by 
Lemma 3.15) Mp[O] 1-r-Y A for every l-suitable H-assignment Y. An arbitrary 
formula A is (U, H)-realizable if its closure is. 
3.17. Lemma. Suppose H is recursively closed. If E-r-Y A (in U and H) and v 2 u then 
E v-r-Y A(in U and H). 
Proof. By induction on A. All cases but those for + and V are immediate, and these 
two cases are similar. 
Case A is V’xB(x). Suppose (i) s-u-r-Y VxB(x) and v 2 u. Now suppose given t1 in 
H with Y, r1 v-suitable for B. Let r be defined so (ii) t/f3 = ItO, for &$v; = 11/8 for 
0 E u. Then 5 is in H, by hypothesis of recursive closure, and is u-suitable; so by (i), s//t 
u-r-Y, (B(x), whence by induction hypothesis (IH): (iii) E//< v-r-Y, 5 B(x). Using (ii), 
for all 0 E U, (E//t)/6 = (&/e)/(t/e) = (&/e)/(51/e) = (&//tl)/O. SO with (iii), (ii) and 
Lemma 3.15(ii): E//<~ v-r-Y, l1 B(x). 0 
3.18. Lemma. (i) Suppose t is a term and 1 t1’ is the interpretation of t for assignment 
Y. Then E u-r-Y A(t) iff E-u-r-Y, (t(’ A(x), with I tl’ assigned to x. 
(ii) Similarly, if g is a functor: E-u-r-Y A(g) ifs E u-r-Y, lgl’ A(a), with jgIy assigned 
to a. 
3.19. Definition. We define u * 0 (in N + N) for u a natural number, 8 E U: 
3.20. Lemma. Suppose H is recursively closed. Suppose ul, u2 nodes of U and Ed, ~~ in 
H such that 
(i) for all 8 E U, E~/(u~ * e) = E~/(u~ * e). 
Suppose A is a formula not containing o; Y1 is a uI-suitable H-assignment for A; Y2 is 
a u2-suitable H-assignment for A with 
(ii) for all 8 E U, Y,/(ul * e) = Y2/(u2 * e). 
Then: Ed uI-r-Y, A iff ~~ u2-r-Y2 A. 
Proof. By induction on A. 
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Basis: Suppose A is prime of form s1 = s2. (sl uI-r-Y1 A) * (A is ul-true-Yi) * 
(A is u2-true-!Pz) [using (ii)] G. (Ed uz-r-Y2 A). [Note that the hypothesis that A does 
not contain w is needed here. Suppose, e.g., A is o(0) = 0; then w(O) = 0 is 2-true- but 
not 2’-true-.] 
Induction step: All cases are straightforward, e.g.: 
Case A is B -+ C. Suppose (iii) s1 ul-r-Y1 B + C. Suppose v2 2 u2, say v2 = u2 * z. 
Let v1 = u1 *z. Now suppose a2 v2-r-Y2 B. Define al so (iv) al/(vl * 0) = Q/(VZ * 0). 
For the given vl, v2, the definition can be given as cxl = A@[c(~, e] for partial 
recursive cp; so by hypothesis of recursive closure, al is in H. From (i)-(ii), we get for all 
8 E u, (v) EJ(v~ *e) = g2/(v2 * 0) and (vi) Yl/l(~, * 0) = Y2/(v2 * 0). By IH with (iv): 
al vl-r-Y1 B. Now by (iii): &1//Q vt-r-Y1 c. Using (iv) and (v), 
(E~//cI~)/(v~ * 0) = (E~//cI~)/(v~ * 0). So by IH with (vi): ~~//a~ v2-r-Y2 C. 
Case A is VxB(x). Suppose a1 ul-r-Y1 VxB(x). Suppose v2 2 u2 and r2 is such that 
Y,, t2 is a v2-suitable H-assignment for B. Define 5i so tl/(vl * 0) = t2/(v2 * 0). Then 
Y1, t1 is a vl-suitable H-assignment for B. So by hypothesis, al//t1 vl-r-Yl, 51 B. By 
(i) and (ii), and IH: e2//t2 v2-r-Y2, t2 B. 0 
3.21. Lemma. Suppose H is recursively closed. A formula A containing exactly free 
variables Y is (U, H)-realizable ifs there exists partial recursive 4 [g, Y] so thatfor each 
l-suitable H-assignment Y: AtI4 [g, Y/e] 1-r-Y A (in U and H). 
Proof. Suppose, with no loss of generality, Y = CI, p. 
(a) If Mp[e] 1-r-VaVfiA, then (((Mp[0])//a)//~) l-r-a, B A, provided a, p are 
in H and l-suitable for A. Let W, a, PI be MWW. Then 
(((~~m)//~)//~) = ne((p wl/(~/~))/(fi/~)) = Aw co, 46 m. 
(-G=) Suppose 4 such that (a) /ie+[e, a/e, /3/e] l-r-a, p A for each l-suitable 
H-assignment a, j?. Then we shall show: /iBna/lp4 [e, CI, b] l-r- the closure of A. If 
v 2 1 and a is a v-suitable H-assignment for Vj?A, then we need /lo4 [e, a/t% j?] v-r-a 
VfiA, i.e. if w 2 v and fi such that a, b is a w-suitable H-assignment for A, we need: 
,464 [S, a/e, file] w-r-a, p A. From a and p we can define l-suitable assignment al, fll 
for A, setting a,/@ = AtO if &$v; = a/0 if 8 E V, and pl/O = AtO if @w; = p/e if 8 E w. 
BY (a), no4 c4 44 hia l- r-al, p1 A, whence by Lemma 3.17, A04 [e, al/g, p1 /g] 
w-r-al, fit A, and then by Lemma 3.15(ii): /l&j [0, a/g, P/g] w-r-a, p A. Cl 
3.22. Definition. If L is a set of nodes of U, we write E L-r-Y A (in U and H) if for all 
u E L, E u-r-Y A (in U and H). 
3.23. Definition. A set of nodes L of U is an H-bar for node u on U if 
(i) L is an H-decidable subset of the nodes of U (that is, the characteristic function 
of L is in H), and 
(ii) every branch of U which goes through u strikes L in a unique node, either u or 
a node v 2 u, i.e. (V’e)[e E u + (3y)(u c g(y) A 8(y) EL)]. 
When the value of H is clear, we write simply “bar” for “H-bar”. 
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To establish the following lemma we use proof by bar induction, i.e. the informal 
equivalent of the principle “26.3 of FIM, or of BI of Section 6 below with parameters 
but in language L. For a comment on this, see Definition 13.3. 
3.24. Lemma. Suppose H is recursively closed. Suppose L is an H-bar for u on U. Then 
for any formula A and H-assignment Y u-suitable for A: E u-r-Y A iff E L-r-Y A. 
Proof. From left to right, use Lemma 3.17. Conversely, use bar induction applied to 
the statement Al (a): 8 ti * a-r-Y A, to show Al (1). To show Va[Vs(E u * a * Pi-l-r- 
Y A) = (E u * a-r-Y A)], use induction on A. All cases are straightforward, for 
example: 
Case A is B v C. Suppose IH and (i) V’s (E u *a * 2”+l-r-Y B v C). Suppose 
(ii) u 2 u * a and for all 0 E u, (E/O), (0) = 0. We show [s] 1 v-r-Y B by cases. 
Case 1: u = u * a. Then for all s and for all @ E u * a * 2Sf ‘, (&/g),,(O) = 0. Using(i), for 
all s: [E]~ u*a*2S+’ -r-Y B. By IH: [E]~ v-r-Y B. 
Case2: v 2 u*a.Thenforsomes,v 2 u*a*2”+‘.By(i)andLemma3.17:sv-r-Y 
B v C. Then [E]~ v-r-Y B. 
Thus Vv(vzu*a~~‘8~v(~/6)~(0)=0 [] * E 1 v-r-Y B). Similarly, Vv(u I> u * a 
A V’8 E v(~/0),(0) # 0 * [aI1 v-r-Y C). So, c: u *a-r-Y B v C. 
Case A is VxB. Suppose IH and (i) VS(E u*~*2~+‘-r-Y VxB). Suppose v 2 u*a 
and Y, 5 is a v-suitable assignment for B. We need: (a) E//[ v-r-Y, (B. 
Case 1: u = u * a. Then for any s: Y, r is a u * a * 2”+ l-suitable assignment for B. So 
by (i) for every s: E//[ u * a * 2S+1-r-Y, r B. By IH (a). 
Case 2: u I u * a. Then for some s, v 2 u * a * 2”+ ‘. By (i) and Lemma 3.17, (a). 
4. Reduction to FIM realizability 
4.1. In this section we outline how Kleene’s 1965 function realizability coincides with 
(U, &,)-realizability restricted to the language L of FIM. Except for the notation 
introduced in Definition 4.3, this material is not used in later sections. Our concern 
here is only to verify that 1965 realizability is a kind of (U, H)-realizability. 
We write “E FIM-realizes-Y A” for Kleene’s notion where Y is “an FIM-assign- 
ment” for A. 
4.2. Lemma. For each formula A, each E in Co, each C,-assignment Y for A, and each 
u in U: 
E u-r-Y A(in U and C,) ifs E 1-r-Y A (in U and C,). 
We define a mapping 2 from FIM-assignments to &-assignments. 
4.3. Definition. The map * : (Cu N) -+ C,, is defined as follows. For each 
cc:N+N,c?=Aea, and for each x in N,x’=Aenyx. Then if Y=a,,,...,a,, 
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x0, ... 7 x, is an FIM-assignment for a formula A, we define Y$, the corresponding 
Co-assignment: Y t = c( * o)...) c&x; )...) x,f. 
4.4. Definition. We define a map F : Co + (N + N) and a map G: Co + N, as 
follows. For EECO, F(a) = 1~tl(2’+~ * 8(y,)) 2 I), for 8 = Ix0 and 
y, = #uya(2”+’ *e(y)) > 0, and G(a) = (F(x))(O). Let Y = ao, . . . . a,, to, . . . ,5, be 
a Co-assignment for a formula A, where the ai are assigned to function variables and 
the ti to number variables. Then Y-, the corresponding FIM assignment, is 
F(ao), . . . , f’bm), G(to), ... 9 G(L). 
If Y is an FIM-assignment for A, then (Y *)- = Y, and if Y is a Co-assignment for 
A, then (Y”-)* = Y. 
4.5. Lemma. For each formula A of L: 
(i) for each FIM-assignment Y for A and each E in C, if E FIM-realizes-Y A, then 
Ae& 1-r-Y $ A in U and Co; 
(ii) for each Co-assignment Y for A and each E in C, if A0 E 1-r-Y A in U and Co, then 
E FIM-realizes- Y - A. 
Proof. It suffices to prove by induction on A that for each FIM-assignment Y for 
A and each E in C: E FIM-realizes-Y A if and only if /lo E 1-r-Y t A in U and Co. 
Basis: If A is prime, then we need A is FIM-true-Y iff A is l-true-Y *, which is clear 
from Definition 4.3. 
Induction step: We do a few cases. Note first that for E and b in C, we have 
(1) (AeE)//(JI@) = ne(((ne&)/e)/((neB)/e))) = ne(E/fi). 
Case A is B + C. 
( a) Suppose (i) E FIM-realizes-Y B + C. Suppose (ii) Aepu-r-Y t B. We need: 
(/ie E)//(.‘ieg) u-r-Y* C. So with (1) and Lemma 4.2 we need: (2) ne(&/j) l-r-Y* C. By 
(ii) and Lemma 4.2, A8 /? 1-r-Y$ B, whence by IH: fi FIM-realizes-Y B. Then by (i), 
E//I FIM-realizes-Y C. By IH: (a). 
(-c=) Suppose (i) mE 1-r-Yt B --t C. Suppose (ii) B FIM-realizes-Y B. We need: 
(a) c//3 FIM-realizes-Y C. By (ii) and IH: (iii) _40/3 1-r-Yt B. Then with (i) and (1): 
ne(c//?) 1-r-Yt C. By IH: (a). 
Case A is B v C. 
(3) Suppose (i) E FIM-realizes-Y B v C. Suppose for all 6,O = ( [neE]o/e)(o) = 
(k9((~eE)/e)0)/0)(0) = (~e(~)O)/O)(0) = (C)~(O). By (i) then: (E)1 FIM-realizes B. By IH, 
(ii) net&j1 l-r-Y* B. AlSO [neEll = m((neE)/o)l = &?(E)1. SO (ii) yields [neE-jl 
1-r-Yx B. Similarly, if for all 8,O # ([ne&]o/e)(0): [AC!IE]~ l-r-Y% C. 
( -c=) Similarly. 
Case A is VxB(x). 
(=-) Suppose(i) E FIM-realizes-Y VxB(x). We need to show kl E l-r-Y* VxB(x). 
Suppose i; is such that Y %, 5 is a u-suitable, hence a l-suitable, Co-assignment for tlxB. 
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Then 5 is Aoily n for some natural number n. Using Lemma 4.2, we must show 
(40 .+//(A6 ;ly n) 1-r-Y *, Aelyn B(x), which by (1) is 
AB(s/ly n) 1-r-YX, A0 1y nB(x), or (a) A0 (c/Ay n) l-r-Y*, n* B(x). 
But from (i): for all n, (s/iy n) FIM-realizes-Y, n B(x). Then by IH: (a). 
( e ) Similarly. 
4.6. Theorem. For each formula A of L: A is FIM-realizable ifl A is (U, CO)-realizable. 
Proof. Recall that A is FIM-realizable if and only if there is general recursive E so 
(i) E FIM-realizes the closure of A. 
( a) Suppose there is recursive E so (i). Then by Lemma 4.5 A6’ E l-r- the closure of 
A,in UandCa. 
( e ) Suppose A0 p [S] l-r- the closure of A, in U and Co, where p is partial 
recursive. Since A0 p [e] is in C,, we must have p [e] = E for some fixed E (independent 
of e), which then must be general recursive, by the recursivity of p. By Lemma 
4.5, (i). 0 
4.7. Similarly, we can obtain Kleene’s “C/realizability” for each class of functions 
closed under general recursiveness (FIM, p. 111). In particular, for formulas A of L, 
A is FIM-R/realizable iff A is (U, &)-realizable. 
An alternative to Theorem 4.6 is to use the spread UO consisting of a single 
branch 8, = ilt0 and to let H be C. Then (U,, C)-realizability is equivalent to 
FIM-realizability. 
5. (U, II)-realizability of S1 
Let H be a set of functions from C. We deal with a few preliminaries before 
establishing in Theorem 5.4 the basic realizability theorem, for H recursively closed, 
for the core system S1 (without either bar induction or continuity but with o; cf. 
Section 2). 
5.1. Definition. Suppose u a node on U, and Y = I,$~, . .. , $, a list of functions from C. 
Then Y is u-proper if each $i is u-proper, i.e. for each natural number t and each 8 E u 
there is unique yi = yi(t) SO ~i(2” ’ * G(yi)) > 0. For given 8 E u and u-proper Y let 
Ye(t) = max0 G i G n YiCt). 
5.2. Definition. For any natural number t and finite u-proper list Y from H, let 
D,(t, Y), the u-bar of dejinition of Y at t (for U and H), be the H-bar on node u of 
U which contains for each 0 E u the sequence number max(u, @(ye(t))). We write 
D,(Y) for D,(O, Y). 
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5.3. Lemma. Suppose A (Y, z) is a formula of L* containing variables Y, z. Suppose for 
some fixed list !P of functions from H assigned to the variables Y’, we have that for 
every number s: Ag(Q[Y/g, s*/g]) w-r-!P,st A(Y, s) in U and H. Then 
At3Aa(Q[Y/g, a]) w-r-Y VsA(Y, S) in U and H. 
Proof. Assuming the hypotheses, we show that for every r~ with Y, a u-suitable for 
A(Y, a): (a) (/i&ia(Q[Y/0, a]))//a = ne(fi[Y/e, a/e]) w-r-Y, a A(Y, s). Given a, 
let B = D,,,(a) = D,(O, a) be the w-bar of definition of a at 0. Then using Lemma 3.24, 
(a) will follow if we can show: (b) for every v in B /ISQ[Y/e, a/e] v-r-Y, a A(Y, s). 
To show (b), assume v is in B. So w E v and by hypothesis and Lemma 3.17: for all s, 
/le(f-iqlu/e, 2/e]) v-r-Y, st A(Y, s). Also since v E B, there is s so that for all 8 E v, 
(ale) (0) = s; hence for all 8 E v and all x, (a/e)(x) = (a/e)(O) = (s:/@(O) = 
(s*/@(x). Then for 8 E V, Q[ Y/g, a/g] = Q[Y/e, s*/e]. SO (b) follows, using 
Lemma 3.15(ii). 0 
5.4. Theorem. Suppose H is recursively closed. Let r be formulas of L* all of which are 
(U, H)-realizable. If r FE in S1, then E is (U, H)-realizable. 
Proof. For fixed choice of H, by induction on the length of the given deduction. 
The proof consists of straightforward adaptations of cases in Kleene’s earlier proof 
in FIM, Ch. 2. 
Basis: We give some sample cases. 
Case l(a): E is of form (A + (B --) A)). 
If E contains free variables Y then for each corresponding l-suitable assignment Y: 
E is l-realized-Y by E = ,48/irc& n. For, suppose (i) rc u-r-Y A for some u 3 1. 
Suppose p v-r-Y B for some v 2 u. NOW (E//TC)//~ = A0 rc/tl. Since for all 8 E u, 
(&I 7$3)/e = rc/l3, we have from (i) and Lemma 3.15(ii): (E//TC)//~ u-r-Y A, whence with 
Lemma 3.17: (E//X)//P v-r-Y A. 
Case 6: E is of form (A -P C) + ((B + C) --f (A v B -+ C)). 
If E contains free variables Y then for each corresponding l-suitable assignment Y: 
E is l-realized-Y by ne(4(0, Y/8)), where 4 is the constant function defined by 
where 
X[IEo, El, '11 = 
i 
EO/(YI~ if (~1)~ (0)= 0, 
h/(rh if (v)~(O) f 0. 
Suppose(i) e. u-r-Y A + C and for some v 2 u: (ii) E~ v-r-Y B --+ C. We must show: 
/ienV (x [Eo/e, E1/e, tj]) v-r-Y A V B -P C. Suppose for w 2 v: (iii) q w-r-Y A v B. We 
must show: 
(a) nexCEO/e, El/e, q/e] w-r-Y c. 
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Let Dw(q) be the w-bar of definition of q for 0. We show (a) by showing by cases that 
for every d in D,+,(q): 
(b) M(x[sO/O, &i/0, q/e]) d-r-Y C, and then applying Lemma 3.24. If d is in D,(q), 
then either (Case 1) (q/e), (0) = 0 for all 8 E d, or (Case 2) (q/@,(O) # 0 for all 8 E d. 
Case 1. Then [q]i d-r-Y A by (iii), Lemma 3.17. So /iex[q,/& El/e, q/e] = 
~NMN(vllt%) = ~d/Crll d-r-y c by (9. 
Case 2: Similarly, by (iii) and (ii). 
Case8 Eisi7 -(A-+B). 
E is realized by E = &9nn&kO. For, suppose rc u-r-Y A -+ 1 = 0. For reductio, 
suppose (a) for some u 1 u and some q:q u-r-Y A. Using Lemma 3.17: n//q u-r-Y 
1 = 0, a contradiction. So rejecting (a), there are no u 1 u and q so q u-r-Y A. Then 
s//n: = AeAq;lt 0 v-r-Y A + B. 
Case 10N: E is VxA(x) + A(t). 
Suppose Y, { a l-suitable assignment for E with 5 assigned to x (which may be free 
in A(t)). Then E = Mnn(x/( I tl’~‘)/e) 1-r-Y E. For, suppose rc u-r-Y, 5 VxA(x). Then 
rc u-r-Y VxA(x) [Lemma 3.15(i)]. Then for all u-suitable q, x//q u-r-Y, q A(x). Put 
q = ltly.5. SO z//ltI’P%5u-r-Y, ltlyS5 A(X). Then E//~c = ne((n/O)/(Itly,r)/f9)) = q/(tly,5 
u-r-Y, l A(t) [Lemma 3.18(i)]. 
Case 13: E is A(0) A Vx(A(x) --f A(x’)) -+ VxA(x). 
E is l-realized-Y by A@ 4[0, Y/e], where 4 is the function defined by 
4 [e, @] = As& (x [E, q(O)]), with x defined by recursion: 
x C&9 01 = ~40, 
XC&, n’l = ((&)l/nY WxC-I. 
Suppose (i) E u-r-Y A(0) A Vx(A(x) --, A(x’)). We must show M&x [s/e, q(O)] 
u-r-Y VxA(x). For this, we shall use Lemma 5.3, for which we need for every number n: 
(a) nex [E/e, (d/e)(o)] = (ieX[&/e, TI] u-r-Y, n* A(X). 
We use induction on n. If n = 0, then (a) is Mx[s/& 0] u-r-Y, O* A(x), but 
M x[s/e, 0] = nB (s/e),, = [&lo. Use (i) and L emma 3.18. Assuming (a) holds for IZ, 
then by (i): ([.s]1//n*)///iex[+3, n] u-r-Y, nt A(x’), which simplifies to 
M(((s/0),/(Ayn))/x [s/e, n]) u-r-Y, n* A(x’). But this realizing function is by definition 
M(x[.& a’]). Thus M(x[s/e, n’]) u-r-Y, n$ A(x’), and using Lemma 3.18: 
ne(x[&/e, d]) u-r-Y, (n’)z A(X). 
Case “0.1: E is (Axr(x))(t) = r(t). 
This is l-realized-Y (where Y includes correlates to the free variables present) by 
neit 0. Let Y = @, E, t with Qi including correlates to function variables and Z-, l 
including correlates to number variables, where 5 is correlated to x (which may be free 
in t). We have 
IW(4)W = AelY ~~~~~~~~~~~~ WR wm, 0) (Lemma 3.4) 
= ne~Y((~xcp,,,,(Qi/e, (El/e)(O), X, e))(cp,(~/e,(~e)(o), e)) 
(Definition 3.3) 
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= ~~~YGP,~WT w9(0), (~4w wm, e), 0)) 
(Definition 3.3) 
= Aely qlm(@/O, (s/e)(O), 0) (Definition 3.6) 
= Ir(t)lY (Lemma 3.4). 
Then for all 0:(~(lxr(x))(t)~y/8)(0) = (Ir(t)l’/e)(O). 
Case “1.1: E is x = y + a(x) = cr(y). 
This is l-realized-<, ye, OE, for l-suitable assignment 5, n, LY, by ABA&r 0. Suppose 
rr u-realizes-t, q x = y. Then for all 8 E u: (t/e)(O) = (r,@)(O). So, for all 8 E U: 
(u/e)((t/e)(O)) = (aie)((vlie)(o)). Thus At 0 u-r-5, V, C( M(X) = U(Y). 
Case “2.1: E is Vx3crA(x, a) --+ 3/3VxxA(x, iy/?((x, y))). 
This is l-realized-Y (where Y are correlated to the free variables present) by 
P = nenr0t (ni~z(t)o)o((r)I), ~5(+5(0))~) 
Suppose (i) rt u-r-!? Vx3aA(x, OZ). We need: 
(a) P//X u-r-Y 3/NxA(x, Ilyfi((x, y))), which is equivalent o 
b/h11 u-r-y, b/h10 ~~46 AYB(CG Y>)). 
Now p//n = ne(~t((7C/8)l~z(t)O)O((t)l), MWWM(W1 >. So we need: 
~~~twew3oh u-r-y, nent ((~ie)inz(t),),((t),)v’xA(x, AYB((x, Y))). 
Suppose (ii) v 3 u and (iii) Y,A~~t((~/O)/~z(t),,),,(t)l), 4 is v-suitable for 
A(x, lyjI((x, y))). We need: 
ne((7lie)i~z(rie)(O)), v-r-Y, ne nt((~ie)inz(t),),((t),), t 0, ~YB((x, Y))). 
The value of ,Iyfl((x, y)) under this interpretation by Definition 3.6 is 
in~p((x,~>)l~ne;it((71/e)i~z(t)~)~((t)~), tl = ~~~y((~iw~z(5/~)(0))o(y). 
So using Lemma 3.18, (a) becomes: 
(b) ne((71/e)/~z(5/e)(0))1 r-r-Y, 5, neny((71/e)/lz(5/e)(0))o(y) A(x, B). From 
(i)-(iii): (iv) [rr//ZJr v-r-Y, [TC//<]~ ,4(x, a). By (iii), for all 8 E v: for all z, 
(</e)(z) = (l/e)(O). Then for all 8 E V: (n//Q/O = (@3)/(5/O) = (@3)/(Az(</0)(0)). SO for
all 0 E 0: rn//5i1/e = ((0)inz(rie)(O)), and CMW = ((@)l~z(W)(0))O = 
~y((~/@/~z(~/0)(O)),(y). Then from (iv) and Lemma 3.15 (ii), we deduce (b). 
Induction step: We give examples for rules of inference. 
Case Rule 9: for C not containing free CI, 
c -+ A(a) 
c + V&4(u) 
Suppose for every l-suitable assignment Y, u: (i) Ae, [(!I, Y/e, a/e] l-r-Y, 
u C -+ A(a). Then for every l-suitable ‘y: E = Af9ArcAcl((&[& Y/0, al/e/$ 1-r-Y 
C + V’aA(a), as follows. 
Suppose (ii) rc u-r-Y C for some u 2 1. We need: 
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AeAcc((+[e, Y/0, ~]/@/(n/e)) u-r-Y ‘v”aA(cr). Suppose a in H is u-suitable for tl in 
A(U). We need (a) Af3((4[0, Y/e, a/e]/e)/(n/e)) u-r-Y, a A(M). Define CQ so (iii) 
al/e = x/e, for 8 E U; = AtO, for &u. Then CI~ is l-suitable for CI in A(a) and by (i), 
Lemma 3.17 and (ii): (A&$[& Y/e, xi/f!I])//n u-r-Y, ozl A(X). With (iii) and Lemma 
3.15(ii) this gives (a). 
Case Rule 12: for C not containing free cz, 
A(U) --t c 
3ctAfa) -+ c 
Suppose for every l-suitable assignment CI, Y: (i) A@[& cl/e, Y/e] l-r-a, Y 
A(a) -+ C. Then for every l-suitable assignment Y: E = AeAa(#[e, (c)e, Y/e]/(&) l-r- 
Y IaA(a) -+ C, as follows. 
Suppose (ii) (T u-r-Y 3d(a) for u 2 1. We need: 
(a) r//a u-r-Y C. But 4/a = ne(4 ce, (~/% Y/W(4%) = ww co, Cold 
0, Y/e]))//[all. By (ii), [aI1 u-r-[a&, Y A(U). So by (i) and Lemma 3.17: s//a 
u-r-[a&, Y C. By Lemma 3.15(i), s//a u-r-Y C. 
6. Lawlike sequences 
In treating further axiom schemes we find the notion of a lawlike sequence 
convenient. We interpret such sequences imply as recursive sequences. We select to 
express “CL is lawlike” the formula U(E) in the language L of FIM: 
U(E): 3eVx3y(T(e, x, y) A a(x) = U(y)), 
where T(e, x, y), U(y) represent Kleene’s predicate Ti (e, x, y) and function U(y), 
respectively, of [S]. 
Note for use below that the sentence 
~e~x(TvT(e, x, y) + 3!y(T(e, x, Y)) 
is provable in Heyting arithmetic (and so in S,), and thus by Theorem 5.4 (U, H)- 
realizable for recursively closed H. 
6.1. Lemma. E u-r-a U(a) in U and H if 
(a) E in H, and 
(b) for every 6’ E u: 
(i) for all n, (&/e),(n) is dejined and (&/e),(n) = (#),(O), 
(ii) (s/&(O) is the Giidel number e of a general recursive function {e} of natural 
numbers such that 
(iii) for euery x, (c@)(x) = (e>(x) and 
(iv) for every x and n: 
(kw/xwe)(n) = ,uyTl(e, x9 Y). 
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Proof. It is convenient o assume T(e, x, y) in form f(e, x, y) = 0 for primitive f of Si, 
so that for arbitrary u-proper 6: 6 u-r-Y T(e, x, y) iff T(e, x, y) is u-true-Y. 
For E in H, [E U-Y-C? M,(a)] iff 
[[&II u-r-a, [&IO ~x3y(Tk x, Y) A 44 = u(y))1 ifl 
[for every w z u and every w-suitable 5: 
[for every w 2 u and every w-suitable t: 
T(e, x, y) and U(X) = U(y) are both w-true-m, [&lo, 5, [[s]i//&] iff 
[for every w z U, w-suitable 5, arbitrary u-proper &,, 6i in H and 
Y = c(, [Is],,, 5, [[s]i//&: &, w-r-Y T(e, x, y) and 6i w-r-Y N(X) = U(y)]. 
For * of the lemma, put w = u and 4 = x*, and conclude (a) and (b). 
For G, assume (a)-(b). Suppose w z u and r is w-suitable. If 0 E w then 8 E u, so 
(i)-(iv) hold for all 8 E w. Let B = D,(<, E) be a simultaneous w-bar of definition at 
0 for 5 and E (5.2). If w1 is in B, there are x and e so for all 0 E wlr (&X))(O) = x and 
(s/&,(O) = e, and then by (ii)-( T(e, x, y) and a(x) = U(y) are wl-true-Y for Y = a, 
[E&, <, [[E]~//&,. Since this holds for all w1 in B, T(e, x, y) and a(x) = U(y) are 
w-true-Y. Then for any u-proper do, 6i in H, we have &, w-r-Y T(e, x, y) and 
d1 w-r-Y a(x) = U(y). So .5 u-r-a LL(cl). 0 
6.2. Lemma. There is primitive recursive 4 so that for all E in H: E satisjies (i)-(iii) of 
Lemma 6.1 ifs C#J [E] u-r-a LL(cr). 
We shall use Lemma 6.2 to shorten the process of finding realizing functions for 
LL(a). 
The following Theorem 6.3(b) could appear later as an easy consequence of 
Theorem 10.2, but the proof here is simpler, not involving the (U, H)-realizability of 
the axiom LS3 of Section 10. 
6.3. Theorem. The following formulas are (U, H)-realizable for any recursively 
closed H. 
(a) \Jx L n(cr(x) = o(x)) -+ iLL(cc), 
(b) 1 LL(4, 
(c) LL(g), where g is a functor containing no free variables and no co. 
Proof. (a) This is realized by A04 [v/e, c@], where 4 [v, a] = ArcAyilyO. Suppose 
(i) n u-r-v, c1 the hypothesis of (a), with v, a correlated to n, CI. Then M,4qAyO u-r-a 
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LL(GL) + 1 = 0. For, suppose n v-r-CI LL(cc) for some v 1 u. Then (ii) for every 8 E v, 
for all x: {(n/Q,(O)} (x) = (c@)(x). Let B be a v-bar of definition for q and v at 0 (5.2). If 
w E B then there are p, 4 so for all 0 E w: (n/Q),(O) = p, (v/e)(O) = 4. But then by (i) and 
(ii), for all 8 E w and all x > q: {p}(x) = (w/e)(x) = e(x). We get a contradiction by 
letting m = 1 + max(lh(w), q) and defining 8, and e2 so 8i, I32 E w and 8r (m) # e,(m). 
(c) Suppose g as described. We must find E so E l-r- LL(g). Now 191 = A0 f for 
a primitive recursive function f: N -+ N. Let p be a Gbdel number of fi Let q be 
nO(Jyp, AyO), and let E = 4 [n] for 4 of Lemma 6.2. Then E 1-r-lg 1 LL(cr). Use Lemma 
3.18(ii). 0 
7. Bar induction 
The bar induction scheme FIM “26.3 is crucial for intuitionistic analysis. 
It follows from Theorem 4.5 and FIM that the bar induction scheme, restricted to 
the language L of FIM, is (U, &)-realizable in the form 
BI: V&xR(&(x)) A Vaseqca,(R(a) v 1 R(a)) 
A Vu sesco,(R(a) + A(a)) A Vases(a) (VsA(a * 2s+l) -+ A(a)) + A(1). 
But now we are interested in the extended language L* and in (U, Qrealizability 
for H = R or some other recursively closed set of functions. It is by no means clear 
that this version of BI should continue to hold (be (U, H)-realizable)). If (U, H)- 
realizability gives to w attributes of a lawless sequence (as we shall verify in Section 
lo), then BI in L* asserts bar induction for the formula R(z) permitted to con- 
tain a lawless sequence. Such an unrestricted form of BI is not (U, R)-realizable 
(Theorem 7.9). 
To get a version of BI which is (U, R)-realizable, we can simply restrict R in BI to 
contain no o and no sequence parameters. (Obviously, any sequence parameter 
c( would cause difficulty, since w might be substituted for a.) The resulting principle 
BIN is (U, R)-realizable by Corollary 7.7. 
A more useful version is RBI (restricted or recursive bar induction) which allows 
sequence parameters in R but only lawlike ones: 
RBI: LL(‘y,) A VdxR(ii(x)) A Vasesca,(R(a) v lR(a)) 
A Vu se,w(R(a) + A(a)) A Vasesw (v’sA(a*2”+‘) + A(a)) -+ A(l), 
where Y0 is a finite list including all sequence parameters of R; LL (Y,) abbreviates the 
conjunction of formulas LL(t,Gi), $i E Yo, and again there is no occurrence in R of ID. 
(U, R)-realizability of this follows from Theorem 7.6. 
A special case of RBI is then 
LL(~)A~d!X~(ii(X)) >oA VU,+&(U) >O+A(U)) 
A tr’LZ,,,,,,(~‘sx’i(~* F+l) --+ A(U)) + A(1). 
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This corresponds to Kleene’s “26.3b except with p now explicitly restricted to be 
lawlike, and with A(a) in the extended language L*. The restriction on p to be lawlike 
seems in accord with Brouwer’s original expressions of this principle. See for example 
Brouwer Cl, pp. 533-5341. (But the editorial note 8 to this passage on p. 609 of the 
same volume is misleading in suggesting that Kleene’s counterexample in FIM, 7.14 
works because the particular R there contains a sequence parameter; in fact it works 
because R, while containing a sequence parameter, is undecidable. In general, in 
Kleene’s formulation of BI, R may contain a sequence parameter, as in the case of his 
“26.3b quoted above, so long as R is decidable. The restriction that R does not contain 
a sequence parameter produces a proper weakening of Kleene’s “26.3; see Corollary 
8.3. Heyting’s hint in this note 8 that a sequence parameter might be disallowed from 
R, while not applying to Kleene’s system, does exactly describe the formulation 
of RBI.) 
In Lemmas 7.3-7.5 and Theorem 7.6 we write /? E U for “/? is an element of the 
spread u”. For U the universal spread this is understood constructively to be 
equivalent o our earlier: /? E C, or b of type N -+ N. This phrasing here emphasizes 
that the core of the realizability argument is a bar induction (in Theorem 7.6) 
involving a bar on the spread U. 
The proof of Theorem 7.6, giving the (U, H)-realizability of RBI for recursively 
closed H, is not immediate. Ultimately we use in Theorem 7.6 an informal bar 
induction. But there are difficulties posed by the fact that realizing an implication 
requires a uniform method which works only on a function u-realizing the hypothesis 
(not also on the node u) and produces a function u-realizing the conclusion. We 
proceed as follows. If R contains only variables for numbers and lawlike 
functions, then for any u-suitable assignment to these variables we are able 
along any branch 8 E u to reach a node at which values of both the numbers 
and the lawlike functions are determined (no longer dependent on additional 
values of 0), as in Definitions 7.1 and 7.2. These nodes form a u-bar B0 
(as in hypothesis of Lemma 7.3). Towards finding a bar B on BE U (for the 
informal bar induction in Theorem 7.6) we show first that at any node w in &, for 
any sequence /? E U, there are x and p so p w-realizes-p(x)* R(z) (Lemma 7.3). 
Arbitrary sequences /3 E U are obtained by letting the 0: of the second hypothesis 
of RBI map w * 8 on 8 (which keeps c( recursive). All this means that the x 
and p of Lemma 7.3 depend on w. However, so long as we know there are such x and 
p we can use the hypothesis of decidability of R to give uniquely (Lemma 7.4(ii)) and 
uniformly (Lemma 7.5) such a pair x and p depending only on (the functions 
u-realizing) the hypotheses and thus satisfy the requirement for realizing the 
implication in RBI. 
We are especially interested in establishing this result for arbitrary recursively 
closed H, and in particular H = R, because it is just in connection with realizing bar 
induction that previous realizabilities have had to use more than recursive functions; 
see the discussion in FIM Ch. 2. Kleene’s example there (p. 112) will be adapted in 
Section 7.8 and Theorem 7.9. 
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This version of bar induction is strong enough to enable us to prove formally, and 
hence to establish the (U, H)-realizability of: if a continuous function f on a closed 
interval or fan I of sequences is represented (in the manner of 3.1) by a lawlike 
function, then f is uniformly continuous on I. 
On the other hand, to obtain the usual Brouwer uniform continuity theorem, 
stating that any completely defined function F on a fan is uniformly continuous, we 
still need to establish that any such F has a lawlike representing function. A restricted 
scheme of this sort is CONT! of the system S* (Section 9). 
7.1. Definition. If &i U-I-cIi LL(ai), i = 0, . . . , k, in U and H, then the u-bar of conver- 
gence for the lawlikes Y = LYE, . . . , &, with WdiZerS .zo, . . . , Ek (Or Simply: for lawlikes 
Y with eo, . . . , &k) is the u-bar of definition &(E~, . . . , &). If w is in Du(eO, . .. , &k) then for 
all ol, 02 E w: (&i/e,)(O) = (&i/0,)(0), whence for all ol, 62 E w and all x: 
7.2. Definition. Suppose Ei u-r-ui LL(Cri), i = 0, . . . , k, in U and H. Let Y = ao, . . . , c$ 
and suppose @ = to,. . . ,&,, is a list of u-proper functions from H. Then the u-bar of 
convergence for lawlikes Y with co, . . . , &k together with @ is the u-bar of definition 
Du(EO~...,&k, ‘fO,...,<m). 
Now suppose y = txo, .. . , cxk and &g, .. . , &k and @ = to, . . . , t,,, are lists of u-proper 
functions, and Ei u-r-ai LL(Cri), i = 0, . . . , k. Suppose w is the u-bar of convergence for 
Y with E o, . . . , Ek together with @. Then for every el, t& E w and i < k: ai/ = Olif82, 
and for i 6 m: ((i/e,)(O) = ([i/e,)(O). 
7.3. Lemma. Suppose R( yb, Go, z) is a formula not containing co, and containing free 
only the sequence variables Y. = Ma, . . . , ‘tk and the number variables Qo, z. Suppose u is 
anodeof UandY=cr, ,..., cc,andeo ,..., Ek are such that: Ei U-r-ai LL(Mi) in U and 
H for i = 0, . . . , k, where H is recursively closed. Suppose @ are H-functions u-suitable 
for Q. in R(Yo, Qo, z). Let B. be the u-bar of convergence for lawlikes Y with co,. . . , Ek 
together with @. Suppose 
(i) w E B. and 
(ii) v. w-r-Y, @ Va3xR(Yo, Qo, E(x)) in U and H. 
Then for each /I E U there is a number x = x(p) and there is p = p(p) so: p w-r-Y, @, - 
/I(x)* R(Yo, Qo, z) in U and H. 
Proof. Choose recursive CQ so that for each fi E U: 
(a) CI~/W*/?=~. P u al in (ii) to get (writing just R(E(x)) for R(Yo, Qio, a(x))): t 
(b) Cv~/hll w-r-y, @, ~(1, Cv~//cd~ R@(x)). 
Let B, be the w-bar of definition &,([~,//a~]~). Each 0~ w is of form w */? for 
fl E U. Let w1 (/?) be the node of 0 = w * fl in B1 and let x = x(p) be given by 
(4 x(B) = (Cvo//~Ilolw *B)(O). 
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Let B be the w-bar obtained from B1 by choosing along each branch 8 = w * fl the 
node u(B) just x(b) nodes beyond w1 (8): 
u E B o (3w1 E u)(wl E B1 A lb(u) = lh(w,) + ext(wi)), 
where 
exth) = C~o//~~l~P * Y(W)) - 4 
with 
Y(W) = PYY(Y s w1* Cuo/b1lo(2*Y) > 0). 
Now consider any p E U. Let u = u(b) E B. We have 
(d) x(B) = (Cu~ll~l~iw * B)(O) = (Cuollallolu * y)(O) for all y in U [since 
u 2 w1 (/I) E B,]. Define p(p) so for all 8: 
(e) ~(P)lw * 0 = Cuo/M1l~(P)* 0. For i < x(B): 
lf) B(i) = (~~/w*P)(i) C(a)1 = (ai/a*M(t + (lhfr) -lb(w)))(i) = (u)i+ih(w) [since 
i + lb(w) < x(/3) + lb(w) Q x(B) + lh(w,(B)) = lh(u)]. 
Thus: (b) * [uo//all1 U-r-Y, @, al, Cod/a& W(4) 13.171 * Cuo//aili n-r- 
Y, @, fl(~(P))~ R(z) C(a), (d), (f), 3.181 *p(P) w-r-Y, @, /%x(p))* R(z) C(i) with 
u 2 w,(e), 3.201. lJ 
7.4. Lemma. Suppose the hypotheses of Lemma 7.3 including (i) and (ii). Further 
suppose 
(iii) v1 w-r-Y, @, V.zSeqlsj (R(z) v lR(z)) in U and Z-I. Then: 
(iv) For each 8 E w, if we define a set of sequence numbers B(g) by 
z E B(g) 0 ((U1//z~)//o*)/e))O(o) = 0 A Vr = z((ul//rf)//O*)lg)O(0) z 0, 
then for each #? E U there is unique x so: p(x) E B(g). 
Proof. From (iii), for any sequence number z: 
(a) (ul//z*)//OX w-r-Y, @, zZ R(z) v 1 R(z). 
Assume /I E U. By Lemma 7.3 we have x and p so: 
(b) p w-r-Y, CD, j?(x)* R(z). 
Suppose 0 E w. If we can show ((vl//B(x)t)//O*)/B)o (0) = 0, then we can find easily 
a least x so that p(x) E B(g). So, assume: (1) ((u1//fl(x)*)//O*)/f9),,(0) # 0. This implies 
there is some v 2 w so that for all 0 E v, (1) holds. Then by (a), [(~~//fi(x)*)//O*]~ 
u-r-Y, @, B(x)*1 R(z). But (b) and Lemma 3.17 give p u-r-Y, @, p(x)* R(z). 0 
7.5. Lemma. Suppose the hypotheses of Lemma 7.4 including (i)-(iii), whence by 
Lemma 7.4 also (iv) holds. Write #(ul, 8, z) for (vl//zs)//Or)/tI. Suppose for some 
sequence number z and some B1 E w: 
(v) (d+k gl, z))~(O) = 0. 
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Then 
(1) for all 8 E w: (4(u1, 8, z))~(O) = 0, 
(2) CW4v1,& 411 w-r-Y, @, zt R(z) in U and H. 
Proof. From (v) we may assume some o 2 w so that for all 8 E u: (+(ul, 8, z)),,(O) = 0. 
Hence from (iii): (a) [A&$(o,, 0, z)] I u-r-Y, @, zt R(z). For (l), assume 8 E w and for 
reductio (using(i), (iii)) assume ($(ui, 0, z))~(O) # 0. Then we may assume some u’ z w 
so for all 8 E u’, (+(ul, 8, z)),,(O) # 0, whence with (iii): 
(b) [AO4(u,, 8, z)ll u'-r-Y, CD, z*l R(z). Now since v 1 w and v’ z w, we have 
from (i), for all /?EU: Y/u*/?= Y/v’*fi, @plumb= Q/v’*/?, and also 
z*/v */I = z$/u’ * /I. So using Lemma 3.20 and (a) we can find p so: p v’-Y-Y, @, Z* R(z), 
contradicting (b). This establishes (l), and (2) follows easily (from (iii)). 0 
7.6. Theorem. RBI is (U, H)-realizable for each recursively closed H. 
Proof. Suppose given an instance of RBI: 
LUY,) A C(Y0, zo, @o)) + A(Y0, co, @o, l), 
where Y. is a list of the free sequence variables in R and LL(Yo), Qi, is a list of free 
number variables in R and A, and x0 are additional sequence variables (beyond 
possibly some of Yo) which are free in A, and where for convenience in defining 
realizing functions, we suppose the hypothesis on the left to be punctuated so as to be 
the conjunction of the two indicated formulas. 
We must define 7~ so that 
(1) for any x and node u, if x u-r-X LL(Yo) A C(X,), then rc//x u-r-X A(Xo, l), 
where X = Y, C, Qi is any u-suitable assignment for X0 = Yo, ZO, Qo. 
We define 7~: 
(a) rr = MA@ [ [x] 1, 11, where Q [v, x] is the partial recursive function defined as 
follows. 
(b) ’ “’ x1 = i 
(((v)o, 1 l4lw(((~)o, 0,l lW)l if (((u)~, o, 1 l~)lO)~ (0) = 0, 
(( (v)~ /x)/O)/AoQ [v, x * 2u(o)+ ’ ] otherwise. 
Towards showing (1) for this 7t, assume for some x and node u that x u-r-X 
LL(‘y,) A C(X,). Then [xl0 u-r-X LL(Yo) and [xl1 u-r-X C(X,). Let E = [xl0 and 
u = CXII. 
Let ~0 = [I~~o.o,o,~I = Cul0.0, I, 02 = Cvl 0.1 ~3 = [v$ and for 0 < i < 3, let Ci(Xo) 
be the ith conjunct in C(X,). Then 
(c) vi u-r-X Ci(Xo). Similarly: si u-r-u1 LL(ai). We must show: 
(2) 71//x = necqu/e, 11u-r-X A(xo, 1). 
If B. is the u-bar of convergence for Y with .so, .. . , .Q together with @ [Definition 
7.21, we can establish (2) by showing: for each w E B,, AOS2[u/O, l] w-r-Y A(Xo, l), 
and then applying Lemma 3.24. So, assume 
(d) WEBB. 
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We need: 
(3) neti [u/e, l] w-r-x A (X,) 1). 
For number z let U(z) be defined: RA( z ) o AK! [v/e, z] w-r-X, zs A (X,, a), with z* 
correlated to variable a. Then (3) would follow from U(1) by Lemma 3.18. Thus we 
can complete our proof by showing U(1). 
From (c) we have the hypotheses (ii) and (iii) of Lemmas 7.3 and 7.4, and (d) is the 
hypothesis (i). So for any 8 E w, B(8) as defined in (iv) of Lemma 7.4 is a bar on U. 
Further, by Lemma 7.5, all such bars are identical. Let B = B(w * AtO). We establish 
U(1) by bar induction (with bar B) applied to U(z). 
Basis. Suppose z E B. Then by conclusion (2) of Lemma 7.5, together with (c) above 
and Lemma 3.15: ((C~lo,~//~*)//~*)//C~~~(C~l o, o, 1, 8, z)]~ w-r-X, z* A(a). Note that for 
all 0 E ~(((ca, l//z3//o*)//c~e~(C~l~,~,1 ye7 ad/e = ((wh Ii4iw((((~/~)o,o, l/4m1 = 
(M52[v/8, z])/O; SO by Lemma 3.15: A&G[a/B, z]) W-Y-X, Z$ A(U), i.e. M(Z). 
Induction step. Suppose z#B and: for each s, A&2 [u/0, z * 2”+ ‘1) w-r-X, (z * 2”’ ‘)* 
A(a). Then by Lemma 3.18: 
(e) for each s, Aes2 [u/e, z * 2”“] w-r-X, zg, s* A(u * 2”+ ‘). Since z$B the second 
clause in the definition (b) applies, and so O[u/e, z] = (((u/e),/z)/O)/noS2[u/ 
e,z*2c(o)+1]. F rom (c) we have [u-J1 w-r-X Vu Sep(aj(V~A(u * 2”+ ‘) + A(a)), and so: 
(f) (CUII //zv/ot w-r-X, Z* VsA(u* 2’+‘) -+ A(u). Putting (e) in Lemma 5.3: 
AeAoQ[t@, Z* 2°(o)+1] w-r-X, Z* V’sA(a* 2’+l). Then with (f), (([u]~//z*) 
//ot)//nefm p/e, z * 20(O)+ 1-j w-r-X, z* A(u), and using Lemma 3.15, AeQ[u/e, z] 
w-r-X, z* A(u),i.e. RA(z). 0 
7.7. Corollary. BIN is (U, R)-realizable. 
Proof. Let Y0 be empty and LL(‘y,) be omitted from RBI. 0 
7.8. We show by adapting to the next higher type the example of Kleene from FIM, 
Lemma 9.8, p. 112, that if a sequence parameter is allowed in the R of BI, one can 
obtain an instance which is not realizable in (U, R). We establish this by showing that 
there is an instance of the formal fan theorem involving a sequence parameter which is 
not realizable in (U, R). (The fan theorem follows from BI by FIM, *27.7, p. 75, *27.9 
p. 76). 
Consider the fan theorem in the form (FIM, *27.9): 
FT: Vu < b3xA(E(x)) --, 3zVa < b3x < z/I@(x)), 
where Va < b abbreviates Va(Vx(a(x) < b + . 
Define the recursive predicates Wi(t, y, 0) and W: (t, y, 0): 
(1) w; (t, Y, e): 7-i ((t)l, t, QYN A (VZ)(Z G Y + 7 2-i m, t, I, 
(2) w: (4 Y, 0): Tt m, 4 Q(Y)) A wk G Y + 7 7-t ((th, 4 Q(Y))), 
(3) W(i, t, y, 0): W,’ (t, y, 0) if i = 0, and W: (t, y, 0) if i # 0. 
(4) R(z, e): 3t -C lh(z)3y d (lb(z) A t) w((Z), -L 1, t, y, e). 
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Now if a is any l-proper recursive function, then the predicates (~/e)(t) = 0 and 
(a/e)(t) = 1 are recursive predicates in 8, t; so there are numbers f0 and fi and number 
f= <fo,fi> so that 
(5) (c4Nr) = 0 iffly T: ((f)~, t, B(Y)), and 
(6) (GO(t) = 1 ifi 3y T,‘((f)l, t, B(Y)). 
Suppose the recursive predicate R(z, 0) corresponds in the formal system to a for- 
mula RI (z, 0). 
7.9. Theorem. The following formulas are realizable in U and R. 
(i) V’a 6 13xR, (a(x), o), 
(ii) Vz3a < ltlx < zl RI (t?(x), w). 
Hence, there is an instance of the fan theorem which is not (U, R)-realizable, and thus 
also an instance of BI (with R containing w) which is not (U, R)-realizable. 
Proof. (i) We must find E in R so that for each s 2 1 and each s-proper a in R, E//LY 
s-r-a CI < 1 + 3xR,(@(x), 0). Suppose (a) v u-r-au < 1 for u 2 s. We need: 
(b) [(e//a)//q]i u-r-a, [(e//a)//nlo RI (E(X), co). We can define l-proper recursive 
CQ from C( SO @,/O)(t) = (a/@(t) for f3 E u; (ul/e)(t) = 0, otherwise. 
Then with (a): for each 6’ and t, (cc,/@(t) < 1. Let f be chosen so (5), (6) hold with 
a1 replacing a. Suppose 8 E u. By cases ((a,/@(f) = 0, (a,/@(f) # 0) [cf. proof in 
FIM, Lemma 9.81 the predicate 3y W((cr,/e)( f),f, y, 0) holds for all 8. Hence 
3y W ((a/0)( f ),f, y, 0) holds for 8 E U, and so does 3xR1 (D(x), 0). Since RI is primi- 
tive recursive there is now no difficulty in obtaining E so (b), in particular let- 
ting [(&//a)//~]~ = n@ [CC, 0) where 4 [CC, S] = ;lypxR1 (a/O(x), 0) if 8 E U; = 1~0 
otherwise. 
(ii) We must find E in R so that for each s 2 1 and each s-suitable [ in R, E//C s-r-[ 
3a f 1Vx < zl RI (Cc(x), co). Again adapting the argument of FIM, Lemma 9.8, define 
CI (from [) in R by 
1 
1 if t < g/e)(o) A 3~ < g/e)(o) z t) w,‘(t, y, e) A e E S, 
(a) (a/e)(t) = 0 if t <(i/e)(o) A 3~ <(i/e)(o) A t)w:(t, y,e) A 8 E S, 
0 otherwise. 
Then E//C can be just ne((a/B), (/15ny 0, .4Cn61yO)), since 
(b) /le/ig,ly 0 s-r-o! Vxcr(x) < 1, immediately from (a). Then use Lemma 3.15(ii). 
Also: 
(c) /ie/ilXGy 0 s-r-a, i Vx d zl RI (c?(x), o), since, assuming that u 2 s and that 
for some u-suitable 5: 6 u-r-5, i x < z, then no x can w-r-a, 5 RI (Cc(x), co) for any w 2 u. 
For if x < z is w-true-t;, 5 and R,@(x), w) is w-true-a, 4, it follows that for some z, q 
(assigned to t, y): t < x < z A y < x A t A W(a(t), t, y, 0) is w-true-z, 5, [, q, a. This 
yields a contradiction by cases from (b). 
Case 1: If cc(t) = 1 is w-true-a, z, we have W (1, t, y, w) is w-true-z, q, whence from 
(a): (a/e)(t) = 0 for all 8 E w, contradicting the case hypothesis. 
Case 2: Similarly. 0 
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8. Continuity: Brouwer’s principles 
8.1. In this and Sections 9-12, we examine the more flagrantly nonclassical of 
intuitionistic principles. We begin with continuity (“Brouwer’s principle for functions” 
in Kleene’s terminology). We first establish the realizability of Kleene’s version of this 
principle (“27.1 of FIM). But note that in the language L* this is apparently even 
a stronger statement, since A(a, B) may contain the lawless sequence w. (That o has 
properties not processed by Kleene’s sequences under this realizability will emerge in 
Section 10.) 
8.2. Theorem. The following continuity principle CONT (Kleene’s “27.1) is (U, H)- 
realizable for any recursively closed H and for A(cr, fl) any formula of L*. 
CONT: Vc+A(a,/?) + 32{V’aVt3!yz(2’+‘*~(y)) > 0 
A v’av/?[vt3yz(2’+’ * cl(y)) = P(t) + 1 + 4~ IN). 
Proof. Assume x u-r-Y V’crI/?A(cr, /?). Then: 
(i) for every v 2 u and every v-proper a from H, 
This suggests that our interpretation of z ought to be 
ct o, Fit Z’ = nencl ((rc/@/ ) so that ~‘//a = ,40 ((r@)/(a/e)), = [rc//a],,. 
so 
fmbdei = ~e~~~X(~z~Y((~‘le)(((2exp(X(O) + ~)W(Y)) > O), 
(lz0, n~flyazo)) 
for r’ as in (ii). We shall show: 
(a) /lep[n/el u-r-Y, z’VaVtt3!y~(2’+~ *E(y)) > 0. 
To achieve this, it suffices to show that for every v 2 u and every v-suitable GI, x from 
H assigned to a, t: 
(Aep [7t/e]//m)//x v-r-z’, ~1, x 3~ {2(2’+ l * cc(y)) > 0 
A vy, (2(2’+l* cc(Yl)) > 0 -+ y, = y)}. 
NOW [(nOp[@]//a)//fJ1 = M(lzO, /iq/itlzO). SO it suffices to show: 
(al) /ienzo v-r-@2(2’+’ *a(y)) > 0, 
(a2) nehjngnzo v-r-0 Vy,(z(2’+’ *os(yl)) > 0 + yl = y), 
where @ = 6 a, X, CA@ C~/W~M&. 
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For (al), we must show ~(2~~~ * c?(y)) > 0 is u-true-@. Towards (ii’) below, suppose 
8 E v. Let te = (x/@(O). By (i) and (ii): z’//cr = [rc//a]a is v-suitable for j?, hence 
v-proper. We can find y, so: - 
(i’) y, = py((r’/8)(((2exp(t0 + i))+/e)(~)) > 0) = ([nepC71ie]iia)iixi0ie)(0). 
The interpretation of term ~(2’~’ * a(y)) under @ = z’, a, x, CW CQW4//xlo is 
i = ~~~~~~~/~~(wwto + w wwd). 
Thus from (i’): 
(ii’) ve E vg/e)(o) > 0. 
For (a2), suppose q from H (assigned to yl) is w-suitable for w 1 v, and 5 is such 
that 5 w-r-@, q ~(2’~’ * ti(yr )) > 0, for w 2 u; i.e. suppose: 
(iii’) r (2’ + 1 * ii( > 0 is w-true-@, q. We need 
((AeAqA@zO)//q)//5 = AeizO w-r-@, q yl = y; i.e. we need: 
(*) yl = y is w-true-@,?. The interpretation of term r(2’+l *a(~~)) under @, 
q is cl = A0h+‘/0)(((2 exp(t, + l))*q((q/Q(O)))). Assume 8 E W. By (iii’): 
(iI/@ > 0. Since also 8 E v, we have from (ii’): (i/e)(O) > 0. Since [x//a& is u-proper 
(by (i)), also [rc//~&, is w-proper. It f0110ws that (tj/e)(o) = ye = ([(nep [n/e1 
//4//xlde)(o) C(i’)l, and this gives (*I. 
Next let: cr[n] = A~A~AgAg(~/~),. SO Ab[n/d] = AeAclApA~ ((7+)/a)l. We 
shall show 
(b) nea[n/el u-r-!?, z’ v’ctVp[v’t3y2(2’+’ *C(y)) = b(t) + 1 + A(& /3)] for z’ 
again as in (ii). So, suppose for some v 2 u that cr, fl are v-suitable assignments for 
variables IX, p, and suppose: 
(i”) 5: w-r-Y, z’, c(, j? V’t3yz(2’+’ *Cc(y)) = /l(t) + 1, for some w 2 v. Now 
((AeoCn/el//cc)l/B)//S = AeWeMde)h = bd/~ll. We need: 
(bl) [rc//all w-r-!?, z’, CI, b A(a, p). This follows from (i), Lemmas 3.15, and 3.17, 
provided we can show: 
(b2) for all 0 E V, /3/e = [n//cx],,/O = ((n/fJ)/(a/~)),. From (i”), for each w-suitable 
x assigned to t, [S//xl1 w-r-Y, T’, a, fi, x, [t//xl0 z (2’+l *ii(y)) = j?(t) + 1, whence 
(ii”) (r(2’+l *Cc(y)) = j(t) + 1 is w-true-z’, a, p, x, [<//xl0 (with [t//xl0 assigned to 
y). Suppose 0 E w. For each natural number n, letting x = n* = Aflizn, so (x/d)(O) = n, 
and abbreviating ([S//&/e)(O) as y,: (B/@(n) + 1 = (r’/8)(2”+’ * (a/e)(y,)) 
[(ii”)] = (AM ((n/tl)/a)o)(2n+1 -*(@9(yJ) CW)l = We)/(~/e)kd~) + 1, which gives 
(b2). 
Finally, to realize CONT we use 
K = AeA~WWa),, (PCXI, aCnl>>. 
Then, letting 6 = (rc)//n), we have 
SO ca = AeA4wwh = c cc~llio = Ae(ddm cC~ilil = ~e(mdei). Use 
(a) and (b). Cl 
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8.3. Corollary. Suppose in FIM the bar induction scheme “26.3 is replaced with BIN 
(restricted to the language of FIM). The resulting system is weaker than FIM; the 
scheme ‘26.3 allowing sequence parameters is not provable. 
Proof. By Theorem 5.4, Corollary 7.7, and Theorem 8.2 all theorems of the system are 
(U, R)-realizable. But by Theorem 7.9 there is an instance in FIM of BI with sequence 
parameter which is not (V, R)-realizable. This instance in FIM is obtained from the 
instance of BI in Si cited in Theorem 7.9 as not (U, R)-realizable, by putting 
a sequence variable for o. 0 
8.4. Though CONT expresses in L* Brouwer’s principle for functions, as 
formulated by Kleene, it is not all we would like. With bar induction now available 
only in the form RBI, a function r obtained from CONT cannot appear in the R 
for a bar induction, unless somehow we can establish LL(z). Thus, we cannot 
combine CONT with the special case of RBI given in Section 7, in a form appropriate 
for Brouwer’s uniform continuity proof (and for other important applications 
as well). 
We next consider the (U, R)-realizability of continuity principles better suited to 
these applications. 
9. Lawlike sequences and continuity 
9.1. We used lawlike sequences in reformulating bar induction as RBI. In this section 
we examine the corresponding reformulation of continuity schemes. 
The schemes in Theorems 9.4 and 9.5 concern the existence under hypothesis 
Vjt13!/?A(a, fi) of functions not only continuous but also lawlike, and giving p from CI. 
Given our equation of lawlike with recursive, and given that the hypothesis 
V~a!l!/?A(c, fi) is to be intuitionistically (hence, constructively) established, they are 
versions of Church’s Thesis (CT). We shall discuss this aspect of Theorems 9.4 and 9.5 
in Section 11. 
In Theorem 9.4 we have a weak scheme WCONT!, with (U, R)-realizability 
constructively established, whereas in Theorem 9.5 we have a stronger scheme 
CONT!, with (U, R)-realizability established by a non-constructive argument. The 
first scheme we include in SZ, while the second is in S*. 
As a preliminary to Theorems 9.4 and 9.5, we obtain the following constructively 
proved Lemmas 9.2 and 9.3. The point of Lemma 9.2 is this. We know that in general 
if x is a function l-realizing- closed V/cc El! PA (c(, #I), then the values of /I are given by Z/Q 
operating on cr/0. But if z l-realizes- closed Va!l!j?A(a, B), then the values of B are 
given from rc and a/9 (and do not depend separately on the values of 0). This will 
enable us to get in Lemma 9.3, Theorems 9.4 and 9.5 the lawlike maps (which must be 
maps independent of 0) which we need. 
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9.2. Lemma. Suppose 7~ l-r- ‘d’a 3! /3A (a, fi) in U and recursively closed H, where A(a, /I) 
contains no w and no free variables other than a and /?. Then for every l-proper c(, every 
8 in U, and every natural number x: 
(1) ((~lW(alWO(x) = ~(a, 0, x) is defined, 
(2) ((4(aP))/(alW0(x) = Y, (a, 6 4 is de@4 
(3) Y (4 8, X) = Y 1 (~6 e,4. 
Proof. Assume the hypothesis. Let a be l-proper. Then rc//~ l-r-a 3 ! /?A(a, /?), whence 
(i) [rr/~]r l-r-a, [r~//a]~ A(a, /I) A Vy(A(a, y) + y = fl). Then [n//al0 is l-suitable for 
variable p, and so, given any x and 8, (1) holds. 
Also from the hypothesis putting o (i.e., 101 or MI 6; cf. remark following Lemma 
3.4) for cc 
(ii) Cd/w11 l-r-w, C~//wlo Ata, P) A tJy(Ak 14 -+ Y = P). 
By (ii), [rr//w&, is l-suitable for /I, and so, putting a/e for 8: ([n//o],,/ 
(a/e))(x) = ((~/(a/e))/(a/e)),(x) = y, (a, 8, x) is defined, as asserted in (2). 
It remains to show (3). Let t(x, a, w) abbreviate 2x+1 *E(w). Then 
(iii) y(a, 0, x) = ((+9/(aie)),(x), 
= ((nie)(t(x, ai& w,)) 1 WO, 
for w, the unique w so (z/@(t(x, a/8, w,) > 0, 
= ((4(2exp(t(x, a/e, w,)) * 6)) 2 1) - &, 
for w, as above and s, the unique s so 
rc((2 exp(t(x, a/e, w,)) * G(S)) > 1. 
For each l-proper CI and number x, let Br (a, x) be the l-bar of definition of y(a, 8, x) 
as function of 8. Then if v1 E Br (a, x) and if el, tIz E vl: ~(a, f!ll, x) = y(a, &, x). For 
such a and x, for each 8 let w, = w,(a, 0) be as in (iii). Then let B(a, x) be the l-bar on 
8 E U defined so: 
(iv) G(z) E B(a, x) iff [B(z) E B,(a, x) A z > ~,(a, e)] 
v [ 3s 6 Z@(S) EB1 (a, x) A z = w,(a, e)]. 
We show: 
(v) for all x, 8, Or E U and all l-proper a: if 8, O1 E v E B(a, x) and if a’ is l-proper 
with a’/8,(w,(a, 0)) = a/8(w,(a, fI)), then y(a’, f!I1, x) = y(a, 8, x). Suppose v = i?(z) 
E B(a, x). Then 3s < z [n((2exp(t(x, a/e, w,(a, 0))) * e(s)) > 11, using (iii), (iv). Sup- 
pose Or E v and suppose a’/8l(w,(a, 0)) = a/e(w,(a, 0)). Then t(x, a’/&J1, w,(a, 0)) = 
t(x, a/& w,(a, 0)) and 3s < z[n((2exp(t(x, a’/&, w,(a, 0))) *qI (s)) > 11. But since 
there is unique w = w,(a’, e,) SO %[7~((2exp(t(x, a’/B1, w))* @r(s)) > 11: 
wJa’, 0,) = w,(a, 0). Then from (iii): y(a’, Q1, x) = y(a, 8, x). 
Note from (1) and (2) that for all a, 8, x: 
(vi) y1 (a, 4 x) = Y (0, de, 4. 
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Now choose some fixed a, 8, x. We wish to show (3). Suppose a l-proper. 
We can choose in succession ul, v2, m, v and u’ so the following conditions are 
satisfied. 
(vii) u1 E B(a, x) and 8 E q, u2 E B(w, x) and a/eE r2, m = max(lh(ur), Ih(v,)), 
v1>u~,lh(u)=mand8~v,v’~u~,lh(u’)=manda/8~u’. 
(viii) Then define l-proper a’ as follows, for all 8” in U and all i: 
(al/u * 0”)(i) = (a/e)(i) if i < lb(u), = @‘(i L lb(v)), if i > lb(u), 
(a’/q)(i) = 0 if cp#u. 
Putting a’ in the hypothesis of the lemma: 
(ix) Cdla’ll u-r-a’, Cd/a’10 Ata, LO A Ed&, 14 -+ Y = PI. 
From (viii), (vii) and (iv): 
(x) for all i < w,(a, t9): (a’/u* e”)(i) = (a/e)(i). Hence by (v): 
(xi) y(a’, u * P, x) = y(a, 8, x), for all 8”. 
Putting o in the hypothesis of the lemma: 
(xii) [n//w11 u’-~-w Cd/w10 Ah, P) A v&4 (6 Y) + Y = 8). 
Now for all i < lh(u’) = lb(u) and all 0”: (o/u’* 0”)(i) = (u’)i A 1 = (a/e)(i) 
[(vii)] = (al/u * e”)(i) [(viii)]. And for all i 2 lh(u’) = lb(v): (w/u’ * 0”)(i) = 
b”(i - lb(u)) = (a’/u*@‘)(i) [(viii)]. Thus: 
(xiii) o/u’ *V = a’/u * Y. 
Define p and g so for all 8”: 
(xiv) p/u’ * 8” = [n//a’ll/(u * 0”) and a/u’ * (3” = [n//a’],,/(u * 0”). 
Then with (ix), (xiii) and Lemma 3.20: 
whence [p& u’-r-o, cr A(a, /3). Then from (xii): ([r~//o]i,~//a)//[~],, u’-I-[Z//W&,, e 
Y = P, with Cd/oh, Q correlated to fi, y, resp. It follows that for all 
8”: [~//oJ,/u’ * 13” = CT/U’ * 8” = [n//a’]O/(v * 0”) [(xiv)]. But then y(a, 0, X) = 
y(a’,u*8”,x)[(xi)] =([r~//a’]~/u*@)(x)[(iii)] =([7r//fi~]~/u’*e”)(x)=y(w,u’*8”,x) 
[(iii)] = y(o, u/e, x) [since by (vii): a/e E u’ and u’ 2 v2 and u2 in B(w, x)] = y, (a, 0, x) 
CWI. 0 
In Lemma 9.3 we establish (U, @-realizability for the rule of inference correspond- 
ing to a form of lawlike continuity. Our main concern here is to use this as a step 
toward axiomatic forms in Theorems 9.4 and 9.5. 
9.3. Lemma. Suppose there is n in R so n l-r- ‘da3 !PA(a, /I), in U and R, where A(a, /I) 
is any formula of L* containing no free variables other than a and j?, and no w. 
Then there is p in R so p l-r- in U and R: +{LL(z) A VaVt3!yz(2’+‘*a(y)) > 0 A 
VaVf3[Vt3yz(2’f’*E(y)) = /I(t) + 1 + A(a, j?)]}. 
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Proof. Assume rc satisfying the hypothesis. Then for every l-proper a: 
(i) [rr//~]r l-r-cc, [n//clJ, A(a, /?) A Vy(A(cl, 7) + y = B), and so for every 8, 
[rc//u],,/e is properly defined and: 
(ii) KWlo/W = WW~~/~M~) = ((ni(~ie))i(aie)),(x) (Lemma 9.2). 
Let 7ro = ne((7t/eye),. Putting tl = w = nee in (ii): 
(iii) for every x and 0, (no/Q)(x) = (($3)/0),(x) is defined. 
Let r. be defined by 
(iv) r. = ne no. 
We shall be done if we can find po, p1 and pz so 
(a) p. f-r-r0 LUr), 
(b) p1 l-r-r0 V’aVEl!yr(2’+‘*Cr(y)) > 0, 
(c) p2 l-r-r0 V’aV/?[V’t3yr(2’+1 *E(y)) = /I(t) + 1 --$ A(cr, fl)]. 
For, then M(ro/B, (PO/e, p1/8, p,/B)) l-r- the desired conclusion. 
For (a), let p be a Gijdel number of rco (as function in N -+ N). Define 
q = MI (lyp, ny0) and p. = 4 [q] for 4 of Lemma 6.2. Then for every 8, 
(po/B)o(0) = p, and for any X: (z,/@(x) = no(x) = {p}(x). So, (a) holds. 
For (b), note first that by (iii) for every w 3 1, every 8 E w, every w-proper u, and 
every x, there is unique y so ((r,/e)/(c@))(x) = (rco/(a/O))(x) = rco(2xf1 *c@(y)) - 1, 
where rco (2,+ ’ *q(y)) > 0. Thus, if $[a, 51 = nent~y(Ko(2(51e)(o)+1 *a/8(y)) > 0), 
then for all w-suitable 5 correlated to t: 
MltO w-r-ro, E, 5, $[a, 51 2(2’+l *a(y)) > 0 and 
nenrnxnt 0 w-r-ro, X, 5, tj [CC, i;] VZ(T(~‘+ 1 * E(Z)) > 0 + y = z). 
So we obtain (b) by defining p1 so 
For (c), observe that by (i) and Lemma 3.17 for every w z 1, and every w-suitable CY: 
(v) [~//alI,o w-r-a, [n//al0 A(cr, j3). Suppose for some w-suitable j?: x w-r- 
x0, t%, p V’t3yr(2’+’ * E(y)) = b(t) + 1. Then for every w-suitable 0 correlated to t: 
Cxll~l I W-r-To, 4 8, fl, Cxlbl0 7 P+ 1 *ii(y)) = b(t) + 1. Then, putting 0 = MAy t for 
any number t: for every 0E w, (t0/0)(2f+1 *@XY~)) = (B/Q)(r) + 1, where Y, = 
W/do/W% SO for all 0 E w and all t: U-WN) = ((~olWWw(~) = W/~lol~)@) 
[(iv),(iii),(ii)]. So from (v) and Lemma 3.15(ii), [r~//cr]r,~ w-r-a, fiA(a,/?). Thus we 
obtain (c) by defining ~2 so: C(PZ//~//BIIIX = C~//~ll,o. 0 
9.4. Theorem. Let A(or, /?) be a formula of L* not containing o which contains as free 
variables besides the sequence variables cx, /I only number variables y,, . . . , y,. The 
following formula WCONT!, expressing weak continuity, is (U, R)-realizable. 
WCONT!: V,a3!/3A(tx,j) +l+z{LL(z) A V&tI!yz(2’+‘*E(y)) > 0 
A v’av’B[vt3yz(2’+’ * E(Y)) = P(t) + 1 + A@, 8)l I. 
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Proof. The formula is realized by q = AktrcAjJtO, by the following argument. 
Suppose for some u and rc, (i) rr u-r-Y Vcr3 ! flA (a, /I, ya, . . . , y,), in U and R, with 
u-suitable Y correlated to the number variables yo, . . . , y,. We need: q//rc = M.4[ It 0 
u-r-Y (in U and R) the conclusion, which we abbreviate 11 C(y,, . . . , y,). Let 
B be u-bar of definition of Y. Using Lemma 3.24, it suffices to show that for every 
u in B: 
(a) AOAjitO v-r-Y the conclusion. Suppose u E B. Let numbers y,, . . . , y, be such 
that for all tI E v, (It/i/e)(O) = yi, 0 < i < n. From (i) and Lemma 3.17, n v-r- 
YVt/3!PA(cr,p,yo,...,y”). Then by Lemma 3.20, x u-r-y0*, .. . , y,: 
V~3!PA(a,p,Yo,.*., y,), with yl* = AO/ltyi correlated to variable yi. By Lemma 3.18: 
(ii) n v-r-Vd!bA(cc,j3,j,, . . . . j$). Then if rco is defined so for all 8, no/B = x/u * 8: 
7co 1-r-V,ctI!fiA(ol,P, jjo ,..., jj,,) (Lemma 3.20). By Lemma 9.3, there is E so 
(iii) E l-r- C(yo, . . . , j,,). For reductio, assume some [ in R is such that c u-r- 
Yv?C(yo, . . . , y,). By Lemma 3.20, 3.18, etc.: (iv) { v-r- lC(yo, . . . , j,). By Lemma 
3,17,(iii)givessv-r-C& ,..., jQ, contradicting (iv). Since no [ v-r-Y 1 C, in U and R, 
then (a) holds. 0 
9.5. Theorem. Let A (a, /?) be as in hypothesis of Lemma 9.3. The following formula 
CONT!, expressing continuity for a closed formula, is (U, R)-realizable. 
CONT!: Vd!/?A(cr, fl) + 3z{LL(z) A v’ctvt3!yz(2’+‘*E(y)) > 0 
A V’crV’P[V’t3yz(2’+’ *a(y)) = /I(t) + 1 --, A@, /I)]}. 
Proof. The proof is only classical, and can proceed from Theorem 9.4 (see below) or 
from Lemma 9.3 by the cases (not constructively justifiable): either (Case 1) there is 
n in R so n l-r- V~3!/?A(cx, p), or (Case 2) there is no such rc. 
Case 1: Using Lemma 9.3, we have p such that p l-r-the conclusion of CONT!, and 
so (using also Lemma 3.17, etc.): AtJA<p l-r- CONT!. 
Case 2. Supose there is no n in R so 52 1-r-V&I ! PA(a, /I). Since A contains no w, we 
can apply Lemma 3.20 to conclude that for no w 2 1 is there rr’ so n’ w-r- 
VaZl!fiA(a, /I). Then AeAg,IyO l-r- CONT!. 0 
The proof from Theorem 9.4 uses the fact that, similarly to the proof just 
given, classically one can establish the (U, R)-realizability of 11 C -+ C, for 
closed C not containing w, by cases: either there is rc in R so x l-r- C or no such 
71 exists. 
9.6. We cannot allow sequence parameters in the hypothesis of CONT!. If A(y, a, /?) is 
y = p, then Va3 !PA(y, a, 8) is provable. Supposing the conclusion of CONT! for this 
A(y, a, /I), it follows that we can prove LL (y), from which: V~LL(JJ). But the latter is 
not (U, R)-realizable by Theorem 6.3(b), and in fact formally contradicts axiom LS3 in 
the next section by Theorem 10.2(a). 
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10. Lawless sequences 
10.1. In the language L*, we represent he property of being a lawless sequence by the 
formula: 
LS(ol): 3z(Seq(z) A CI E z A Vi(i 2 lb(z) -+ a(i) = w(i))). 
We wish to verify under the realizability interpretation the following set of principles 
for lawless sequences. (cf. [ 12, 13,211). 
LSl. Vn Seq(n)34LS(4 A a E 4. 
LS2. V’aVP(LS(a) A LS(P) -+ GI = p v a # p). 
LS3. LS(cC) A A(Ct) + 11 3ns,qC,,[E  n A ~‘((Ls(j?) A fi E II + 11 A(p))]. 
LS4. V zseq (Z) (R(z) v lR(Z)) A Vct(LS(cr) -+ 3xR(cr(x))) -+ V’a3xR(cc(x)), 
where in LS3 A(a) contains no free sequence variable other than c( and no occurrences 
of w, and for LS4 R(z) contains no free sequence variables and no occurrences of o. 
The simple “open data” scheme LS3 has been weakened, even from that in [ 121, by 
the insertion of two double negations, and it also does not include the generalization 
to two or more variables (e.g. to hypothesis LS(CX) A LS(b) A tl # /? A A(a, j3)) of 
[13,21]). It is easy to see (Theorem 10.7) that such a generalization fails for the given 
LS predicate. 
The main application we intend for the lawless sequences i  the rejection of weak 
Markov’s schema in Section 11. But first we observe some other consequences of LS3, 
LS4 and in Theorem 10.5 show that these new axioms are realizable. 
10.2. Theorem. From LS3 there ,follows formally in S2 the existence of a nonlawlike 
sequence: 
(a) S2Fi LL(w), and more generally: 
(b) SZ t LS(ol) --t 1 LL(sr). 
Proof. (a) Suppose LL(o), whence assume Vx3y(T(e, x, y) A U(y) = o(x)). Let A(a) 
be Vx3y(T(e, x, y) A U(y) = a(x)). Then, using the definition of LS(a): LS(o) A A(w). 
By LS3: i13ns,qC,, (CO l n A V/?(LS(fi) A /3 E n -+ iiA(jI)). But 3ns,qC,,(o E n A 
Vfl(LS(p) A fi E n + ii A(P))) is contradictory as follows. Assume 
Seq(n) A w en A V/?(LS(B) A p E n -+ llA(p)). Define /? so p(i) = (n)i I 1, i < lb(n); 
/?(ln(n)) = 1 + U(pyT(e, lb(n), y)); B(i) = w(i), i > lb(n). Then LS(/?) A /J E n. 
However, 7 A (a). 0 
Similarly, we can show that w is not eliminable from the system SZ, in the sense of 
Kleene [S, Section 741. In fact, for any formula A(x, y) of SZ containing no sequence 
parameters, one can show: Sz t 1 Vx Vy(o(x) = y+-+A (x, y)). Use reductio with LS3 
applied to LS(a) A VxA(x, a(x))_ 
A consequence of LS4 is bar induction for the domain of lawless sequences, in the 
form of BIN of Section 7 with Va(LS(a) + ElxR(E(x))) replacing VCX~XR(CC(X)) as first 
hypothesis. 
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Less immediate is the observation that if LS4 is added even to S1 then we can 
contradict classical ogic. 
10.3 Theorem. If to the system S1 + LS4 is added the logical axiom scheme 
11 A + A, making a system based on classical logic, the resulting system is 
inconsistent. 
Proof. Suppose for reductio: (i) Va(LS(a) -+ 3xa(x) = 0). Then from LS4: 
Va3xa(x) = 0 (letting R(z) in LS4 be (z)~,,(~)_~ = 0), which is clearly contradictory, 
putting a=itl. So, negating (i) we have with classical logic 
3a(LS(a) A 13xa(x) = 0), whence we assume LS (a) A Vxa(x) # 0. Then from the 
definition of LS(a): 3n(a E n A Vi > lh(n)(a(i) = w(i)) A Vxa(x) # 0). Assuming such 
n, we have Vi k lh(n)(w(i) # 0). So from the definition of LS(a): 
Va(LS(a) + 3xa(x) # 0). Then LS4: Va3xa(x) # 0, from which a contradiction 
follows putting a = 1tO. 0 
10.4. Theorem. Both LSl and LS2 are provable in S1 (and so (U, H)-realizable for 
recursively closed H, by Theorem 5.4). 
Proof. LS2. Assume Seq(nl ), Seq(n2 1, a E nl A Vi > lh(nl)(a(i) = o(i)) and 
fi E n, A Vi > lh(n,)(b(i) = w(i)). 
Casei: nl=nz.Thena=fl. 
Case 2: n1 # n2. 
Subcase 2(a): nI c n2. Then if Vi(lh(n,) $ i < lh(n,) -+ (n2)i = w(i) + l), a = B. 
Otherwise, a # /I 
Subcase 2(b): n2 c nl. Similarly. 
Subcase 2(c): 1 nl c n2 A in2 c nl. Then a # B. 
10.5 Theorem. Each of LS3 and LS4 is (U, H)-realizable for any recursively closed H. 
Proof. (I) LS3: We show that _40/ircltO l-r-Y, a any instance of LS3, where Y, a is an 
assignment for this instance. Assume 
(i) K u-r-Y, a LS(a) A A(a). 
We must show: M&O u-r-Y, a the conclusion of LS3, say11 3nC(n). This follows (by 
Lemma 3.24) if we can show there is some H-bar B for u such that for every v in B: 
M,ItO u-r-Y, a 113nC(n), and this in turn follows if we can show that for every v in 
B there is q so ye v-r-Y, a 3nC(n). 
The idea we shall carry out is this. Information K as in (i) must come ultimately from 
an underlying branch 0 of the tree U but may come in two ways: first, in the initial 
segment of 8 beginning with u and continuing far enough to determine values of any 
number parameters, and, second, in values of 8 needed to compute the initial segment 
of a specified in LS(a). We consider a bar B at which nodes determine these pieces of 
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information. Essentially, the length of such a node gives us the n required in the 
conclusion. The dependence of n on these nodes of 8, and not just extensionally on 
values of rc/e, means that we do not define n (or q) uniformly in the way required for 
realizability of the usual scheme and we must introduce the 11’s. 
From (i) we have (ii) [~]~,i,~ u-r-q [K],,~ ~1 E zl, and (iii) [r~]~,i,i u-r+, 
[K]~,~ Vi 2 lh(z,)(a(i) = w(i)). 
We define a bar B on u as follows. Let D = D,(Y, [IC],,~) be the u-bar of definition 
of !I’, [K]~,~ at 0 (Definition 5.2). Then for each w E D there are unique wi E w and 
z1 = zi(w) such that [r~]~,~(2~*wi) = z1 + 1. So for all WED and 8~ w, letting 
z(0) = ([K]~,~/Q)(O), we have z(Q) = zi(w). Define B by 
v E B iff 3w c v [w E D,(Y, [IC]~,~,) A lb(v) = max(lh(w), lh(z,(w)))]. 
To complete the proof, we shall show: (a) for each v E B there is r~ so [q]i 
v-r-y, 4 Cd0 W. 
Suppose r~ EB. We shall define rl effectively but from both K and v rather than just 
from JC, as would be required to establish the realizability of LS(N) A A(a) + 3nC(n). 
Let q = M(kz * al, ((AtO, AtO), np&ljkO)), where (iv) z = z(e) = ([tc]o,o/B)(0), 
(V) 01 = nh(z) < i< lh(u)Pi exp(v)i. Then (CMWO) = z * v1 and to obtain (a) we must 
show MltO v-r-(z * vl)* Seq(n), which is clear by (iv) and (v), and also: 
(b) M&O v-r-a, (z * vr)$ CI E n, and 
(c) nenpnyncnto v-r-Y, (z* v~)* Vj?(r;S(p) A /I E n + 77 A(p)). 
For (b) it suffices to show that for 8 E v and for i < lh(z* vl) = lb(v): 
(Q)(i) + 1 = (Z * Vl)i. 
Case 1: i < lb(z). Then @/O)(i) + 1 = (z)i from (ii). 
Case 2: lb(z) < i < lb(v). Then (Q)(i) + 1 = O(i) + 1 [(iii)] = (V)i = (z * t~i)~ [(v)]. 
For (c), assume fl in H and assume (vi) y w-r-z * vl, /I LS( b) A b E n for some w 2 v. 
Then [r]i w-r-z * vl, /3 fl E n, and it follows with (b) that (vii) for every m < lh(z * vl) 
andBEw:(/?/6i)(m)+l=(z*v1),=(a/B)(m)+1. 
We must show M&O = O$ w-r-Y, j? -11 A(b). It suffices to show that for some bar 
B1 on w: (d) for every x E Bi, there is p so p x-r-Y, b A(&. 
We define Bi as follows. First note that if B(y) is the w-bar of definition of y (at 0) 
and if xi E B(y), then there is unique y so (viii) for all 0 E xi we have ([y],&@(O) = y. 
Now define 
x E B1 iff [(i”) there is xi E x so x1 E B(y), and letting y be as in (viii): 
(ii”) lb(x) = max(lh(x,), lb(y))]. 
Assume x E Bi . There are then unique y and unique z * vi so (viii), (iv) and (v) hold. We 
show (d) by cases. 
Case 1: lb(y) < lh(z*vl). Using (iv), (iii), for every m 2 lh(z*vi) and 0 E x: 
(c@)(m) = e(m). Using case hypothesis and (vi), (viii), for every m 2 lh(z * vl) > lb(y) 
and 8 E x: (/?/e)(m) = e(m). Using (vii), f or all 8 E X: a/e = p/e. From (i) and 
Lemma 3.15: [7c]i x-r-Y, j A(/?). 
64 R.E. Vesley /Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 81 (1996) 25- 74 
Case 2: lb(y) B lh(z * ul). Let 
(ix) X2 = 0 * Cnlh(v) < i<lh(y) Pi exP(Y)i) * (nlh(y) i i<lh(r) Pi exP (X)i). 
Then lh(x,) = Ih(x). We now show for all 4: (x) p/x * 4 = a/x2 * c$, by cases as 
follows. If m < lb(v) = lh(z * vi) [(v)], then (P/x * Mm) + 1 = (z * 01 )m 
[(vii)] = (m/x2 * $)(m) + 1 [(b), with v s x2]. If lb(v) < m < lb(y), then 
(p/x * 4)(m) + 1 = ( y),,, [(vi), (viii)] = (a/x2 * 4)(m) + 1 [case hypothesis, (iii), (ix)]. If 
lb(y) < m < lb(x), then (/3/x*4)(m) + 1 = (x), [(vi), (viii)] = (a/x2 *4)(m) + 1 
[(iii), (ix)]. If m 2 lb(x), then (/3/x * 4) (m) + 1 = $(m 2 lb(x)) + 1 = 
(cI/x~*~)(~) + 1. From (i), [rc]i u-r-Y, CI A(a), and since x2 z v 2 u, [K]~ x2-r-Y, a 
A(a). Define p so: p/x * 4 = [K] / 1 x2*4. Since x 2 w 2 VEB and x2 2 VEB: 
Y/x * c$ = Y/x, * 4. Then by (x) and 3.15: p x-r-Y, p A(b). 
(II) LS4: We need E so that if q u-r-Y the hypothesis, then s//n u-r-Y the con- 
clusion. We put: 
E = ~e4~Y(~txo(?, Y), (((h)o)lnt ?i(Xo(% r)))/(W)), >, 
where partial recursive xo(q, y) is given by 
(1) X0(% Y) = ~x(((r)ol~r7(x))l~~O)o(O) = 0.
Thus, we shall find the bar given by R(z) on arbitrary sequences, imply by seeking 
for any given sequence a the first segment of a which satisfies R(z). The decidability of 
R(z) is clearly necessary. The main problem is showing that if every lawless b has such 
an initial segment, then so does any arbitrary sequence a. Observe that for any 8 the 
values of a/O give an element of U and hence the identity lawless sequence o on this 
element is extensionally equal to a/& in this situation we might use Lemma 3.20 to 
carry the realizability for lawless sequence w over to realizability for a. We adapt this 
strategy below. 
Assume 
(2) Cv10 u-r-y ~~s,,w(JW v OR), 
(3) [q]i u-r-Y ‘da (LS(a) + lxR(ii(x))). 
Let B = the u-bar of definition for Y (at 0). Then 
(4) for each v in B: for all 8i, 19~ E v and all $ in Y, ($/e,)(O) = ($/6,)(O). 
We shall show that 
(a) for x = E//V: x v-r-Y Va 3xR(E(x)) for all v in B, 
whence by Lemma 3.24 x u-r-Y Va 3xR(iZ(x)). 
We shall show below 
(b) there is a partial recursive function x(w, y) so that for each w 2 v, any w-proper 
a in H, any 0 E w, and v as given satisfying (2) and (3): 
(bl) x(w, a/0) is defined, 
(b2) (((~l~)~l~~~lWdw @)))lWo(o) = 0. 
We have then for x0 defined in (1): 
(b3) (((s/0),/&$@xo(~/8, a/0)))/AtO),(O) = 0. Put (for the fixed q): ([a] = 
Mlzt q(x,(q/e, a/Q). Then for 0* = /10ltO we have 
(b4) (C(Ctllo//iC~l)//~tI~l~)(~) = 0. 
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Returning to show (a), we suppose w 2 v and a w-proper in H. We need: [x//a], 
w-r-y, x, [Ix//~10 RGW). 
Using (2) and Lemma 3.17 and the fact that Of w-r-i [a] Seq(z) let Bl(a) = the w-bar 
of definition of [( [t&J/~[a])//Oz],, (at 0). F or each wi E Bi (a), we get from (2) and (b4): 
C(Cdo//iC~ll/O*l~ w-r-y, ita) N.4. 
Then using Lemma 3.24: 
(5) [IKvrlolliCal//Ofl~ w-r-K i Cal W. 
Then note that from definition of E and x: 
Cxiialo = [W/rYlal0 = ~~Wx0Wt a/Q), 
and 
= C((C~l0//iCal)//O*l~. 
Then with (5): [x//all w-r-Y, {[a] R(z). This yields [x//al1 w-r-Y, a, [x//al0 R(&(x)), 
using Lemma 3.18, since the interpretation of the term E(x) under the assignment 
a, [x//al0 is i Cul. 
Finally, we must show(b). We shall need some additional functions with properties 
described in (i)-(v) of the next paragraph. It is easy to verify that partial recursive 
descriptions can be given for functions Fi [w, y], Fz [w, y] satisfying (i), (iiia) below, 
and also for functions x(w, Y, q), wz(w, y, q) and predicate Bz(w, y, q) so that if v] is 
given satisfying (2) and (3), then x(w, y) = x(w, Y, ‘I) and w2 (w, y) = w2 (w, y, q) satisfy 
(iv) and (v) below. 
Define Fi [w, y] so that for any y, 0, w and t: 
Let w be a sequence number with w 2 u. Then we can readily find v = v(w, y) so 
v w-r-F1 Cw, Yl IX(B). Hence from (3), we get P = P Cw, Y, ~1 = (CVIIIIJ’I Cw, yl)//v so 
p w-r-!?, F, [w, y] 3xR(B(x)). So 
(ii) CPII w-r-y, FI Cw, ~1, 1~10 R@(x)). 
Let B2(w, y) be the w-bar of definition of [plo (for fixed r~ satisfying (2) and (3)). So 
for each w2 E Bz(w, y) and each e2, 0s E w2: ([plo/e2)(0) = ([p]o/O,)(0) (with both 
defined). Define F2 so 
(iiia) F2 [w, y](t) = 
(w), 2 1 if t < lb(w), 
r(t) if t > lb(w). 
Then F2 [w, y] E w. Find node w2(w, y) E B2 (w, y) so 
(iiib) Fz Cw, ~1 E w2 (w, Y). 
Let x(w, y) be the value of ([~]~/0)(0) for all 8 E w2(w, y). So 
(iv) x(w, Y) = (blolF2 t-w, YIW) 
= (cdoie2w) for all e2 E ~~69, Y). 
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By (i) and (iiia): 
(v) for all t: (F, Cw, YI/Fz Cw yl)@) = r(O 
Now, for any w 2 v, any w-proper CI and 6 E w as in the hypothesis of (b), put 
y = a/e in (i)-(v) to obtain corresponding p = F1 [w, cc/O], 0” = F2 [w, a/O], node 
wZ(w, CC/~) in bar &(w, a/e) and x(w, g/0). Then (bl) follows easily. We shall show 
(b2). Let 
(vi) n: = /lenta/e(x(w,a/e)). 
Let B’ be the w-bar of definition of z (at 0). Choose w1 E B’ so 0 E wl. Let 
X = x(w, a/0)( = x(w, a/0,) for all e1 E wl). Then 
(vii) a/e(X) = a/e,(X) for all e1 E wl. 
Let w3 = max(w,(w, a/@, p(X)). Since with (iiib), 0” E wz(w, cl/e): 
(viii) w3 2 wz(w, c@) and w3 2 0”(X). 
Using (viii): 
(ix) for all e3 E w3. fT3 (X) = 8”(X). 
We show also: 
(x) for all e3Ew3.fi/e3(x) =~/e(x). Suppose e3E w3. 
Case 1: X c lb(w). Then m(X) = F1 [w, a/e]/tl,(X) = q(X) [(i)]. 
Case 2: X > lb(w). Let 
N = nlh(w) < i<Xpi exp(e3# + 1) = nlh(w)$idXpi exp(8”@) + l)[(ix)l. 
Then 
P/e,(x) = F1 h dw3w = aiww)-~ C(i)1 
= F1 [W, Ct/e]/f?(x) = Cd/e(x) [(V)]. 
From (ii), CPII wr-y, 8, CPIO R@(x)). S o with (iv), (viii) and Lemma 3.18: 
(xi) [pll w,-r-Y, MAt(j3/sle(X)) R(Z). Then (b2) holds, i.e. (((~/(&&r/e))/ 
@tO)),(O) = 0, f or rc as in (vi). For, assume otherwise. Then from (2), for some w’ 2 w1 
and all 8’ E w’: (([~]o//~)//O+]/8’)0(0) # 0. Write this (r/Q(O) # 0. By (2): 
(xii) [r-J1 w’-r-Y, nlR(z). For all 8’ E w’ and 613 E w3, (r@‘)(O) = 
I a/&J (x(w, a/O’)) = c@(X) [(vii), since w’ 2 w1 E B'] = fi/e,(X)[(x)]. Thus, for 
all 8, (7~/~'*e)(o) = (nentgle(x)/ w3 * e)(O), whence for all t (n/w’* e)(t) = 
(Mnt /?/0 (X)/ w3 * 0) (t), since both functions are assigned to number variables in (xi), 
(xii). Also by (4), for all 0: Y/w’* f3 = Y/w, * 0. Define cr so for all 8: 
o/w’ * 8 = [p11/w3 * 0. Then using (xi) and Lemma 3.20: 0 WI-r-Y, R R(z). But this 
contradicts (xii). 0 
10.6. It is worth noticing that the proof just completed uses the domain U in a way 
not compatible with viewing it as the domain of lawless sequences (in case the proof 
itself were to be formalized in some system). For, a particular unique element 0” of U 
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is defined and used in the proof. (A similar remark applies to our proof above of 
Lemma 9.2). 
10.7. Theorem. There is an instance of the following scheme, expressing more general 
“open data” for lawless sequences, which is refutable in S1 
IS(a) A LS(B) A o! # p A A(& p) + 
jz[Iu E z A VY &s(Y) A Y E z A Y f fi --t A(?, 8))l. 
Proof. Let a(O) = 0, c((x + 1) = w(x + l), and let p(O) = 1, /3(x + 1) = w(x + 1). Then 
LS(a), LS(#?) and c( # j?. Let A(cc, /3) be Vxcr(x + 1) = fl(x + 1). Then A@, /I) holds. 
Suppose z so VY(LS(~)A~EZA~#/? --+ A(y, fi)), and define y so y E z, 
y(lh(z)) = P(lh(z)) + 1, and y(x) = w(x) for x > lb(z). 0 
Bringing together results thus far: 
10.8. Theorem. (a) For system SZ as described in Section 2: if r k-A in S2 and the 
formulas r are (U, R)-realizable, then A is (U, R)-realizable. In particular, if I-A in 
Sz then A is (U, R)-realizable. 
(b) Zf WCONT! is omitted from S2 then in the resulting system, if r I- A and the 
formulas r are (U, H)-realizable for some recursively closed H, then A is (U, H)- 
realizable. 
Proof. (a) By Theorems 5.4, 7.6, 8.2, 9.4 and 10.5. 0 
10.9 Theorem. For system S* as described in Section 2: if r I- A in S* and the formulas 
r are (U, R)-realizable, then A is (U, R)-realizable. In particular, if k A in S* then A is 
(U, R)-realizable. 
Proof. From Theorem 10.8(a), and the nonconstructively established Theorem 
9.5. 0 
11. Formal refutation of weak Markov principle 
An important application of lawless sequences has been in the refutation intui- 
tionistically of certain classically valid principles, in particular, versions of Markov’s 
principle. Even in the apparently weaker form above (with the 11’s in LS3), the 
axioms LS3, LS4 are powerful enough to refute the weak Markov principle of 
Scedrov-Vesley [181: 
MP-: VxVz(R(x, z) v lR(x, z)) A Vxll3zR(x, z) --) llVxJzR(x, z), 
as we show in Theorem 11.1. This principle is realizable in the sense of FIM, and even 
special realizable (in sense of FIM Ch. 4), which the full Markov principle is not. 
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But by Theorems 11.1 and 10.8, a certain closed instance of it (containing o) is not 
realizable in (U, R). 
11.1. Theorem. In the system S2, for a certain formula R(x, y) containing no sequence 
variables and only the number variables x, y (and containing o) we can show 
k V’xVz(R(x, z) v 1 R(x, z)), 
F Vxll3zR(x, z), 
Fl VxJzR(x, z). 
Proof. In SZ, as we shall show below: 
(1) kVXVYVZ[(Z > y A w(z) = x) v l(Z 2 y A w(z) = x)-J, 
(2) I- vxvyll3z(z 2 y A o(z) = x), 
(3) l--lvxvy3z(z > y A o(z) = x). 
Thus R(x, z) in Theorem 11.1 can be z > (x)~ A o(z) = (x)~. 
(1) is clear. We give details for (2) and (3): 
(2) Suppose (i) 13z(z 2 y A o(z) = x). Assume 
A: Seq(n) A w E n A Vj?(LS(fi) A /? E n + 13z(z 2 y A p(z) = x)), 
Define j?: 
/3(i) = (n)i 2 1 if i < max(lh(n), y) 
= x if i = 1 + max(lh(n), y) 
= o(i) if i > 1 + max(lh(n), y). 
Then U(p) /3 A en. But 3z(z > y A p(z) = x), contradicting A. So also 3nA and 
113nA are each contradictory. But 113nA follows from (i) by LS3, using H(w). 
(3) Assume: (i) VxVyIz(z 2 y A o(z) = x). For an application of LS4, let S(U) be 
lb(u) > 0 A lb(u) - 1 > y A (u)lhcuJII = x. Then (ii) VXV~VU~~~~~~(S(U) V-IS(U)). 
Assume (iii) U(a). Thence we may assume: (iv) CI E m A Vi(i > lb(m) + cc(i) = o(i)). 
Putting x and max (y, lh (m)) for x and y in (i): 3z (z 2 max (y, lh (m)) A o(z) = x). Then 
with (iv): (v) 3z(z > y A a(z) = x). Now (z > y A cc(z) = x)c*S(cC(z + 1)); so (v) gives 
3wS(Cr(w)), and then with (iii), etc.: (vi) Vx Vy V’or(LS(a) -+ 3 wS(ii(w))). Putting (ii) and 
(Vi)in LS4: VXVyVCdW~(~(W))), Or VXVyVCdW(W > 0 A W A 1 > y A oI(W - 1) = X), 
which is contradictory, e.g. putting x = y = 0, u = It 1. 0 
11.2. Corollary. Zf a sequence parameter is permitted in R(x, z), MP- is provable 
neither in S2 nor in FIMN. 
Proof. Let the R(x, z) of Theorem 11.1 be written R(o, x, z). Let A@) be the instance 
of MP- with R(b, x, z) for R, with /I a sequence parameter. This instance is in the 
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language L of FIM. Suppose in FIMN A(P) is p rovable. Then by substitution A(o) is 
provablein SZ. By Theorem ll.l,lA(w)isprovablein S2. But then A(o) andlA(o) 
are both (U, R)-realizable, which gives a contradiction. 0 
This provides a refutation of weak of Markov principle (with sequence parameter) 
in the presence of ‘v’a 3fi-continuity, which we believe to be new. The refutation in [ 181 
works only for V’a 3x-continuity (but for the general scheme of bar induction, allowing 
arbitrary sequence parameters). 
11.3. One can refute MP (with sequence parameter) much more easily than MP-, 
using LS3 and LS4. First, derive (i) Vla(LS(a) -+ 1 Vxa(x) = 0), as follows. Assume 
LS(a) and 13xcr(x) # 0. Then, letting C(/?, n) be (LS(j?) A /? en + -13x/?(x) # 0) use 
LS3 to derive llElnVfiC(/I, n). But we can easily derive 13nVjIC(/?, n). This 
establishes (i). Then, from (i), if we assume MP we obtain: 
(ii) Vct(LS(a) + 3xa(x) # 0), which with LS4 gives the contradictory result: 
Vla3xa(x) # 0. 
11.4. A timid version of a lawless sequences principle, already expressible in the 
language L of FIM, is this weak version of the “outlaw schema” of Burgess [Z] 
insuring a (weak) “outlaw sequence”: 
OUTLAW-: 3/3Vi{i’drElk > n/?(k) # i A [Q(i, /?) 
--) ~~3mV’y(Vlk < my(k) = /l(k) A 3nVk > y(k) = P(k) -llQ(i, y))]}, 
where Q(i, b) contains no variables free other than i, /3. This is similar to our LS3. 
Consider the consequence of OUTLAW- 
OUT: 3BVil Vn3k > n/?(k) # i. 
In the system S’ = FIMN + OUT (in language L), one can easily refute Markov’s 
Principle, in the form 1 Vx > y/?(x) = 0 + 3x B y/?(x) # 0, and one can already also 
refute the weak Markov principle MP-. 
All theorems of S’ are (U, R)-realizable, since (U, Q-realizability of OUT is easily 
established by interpreting fi as one interprets o for the system SZ. 
Some of our treatment of lawless sequence was inspired by these outlaw sequences 
of Burgess. Much of the flavor of lawless sequences can be obtained in S’. However, 
there seems no reason to expect outlaw sequences to obey all the usual lawless 
sequence axioms; for example, there seems no reason to expect them to satisfy LS2. 
12. Church’s Thesis 
12.1. Several formulas of L or L* can be proposed as expressing Church’s Thesis (CT). 
One obvious candidate: 
LL(cr) + 3eVx3y(T(e, x, y) A U(y) = a(x)), 
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for T(e, x, y) and U(y) representing Kleene’s predicates T1 and U, respectively, is 
already incorporated in the definition of H,(a) (Section 6). 
Using CONT!, which was shown by nonconstructive argument in Theorem 9.5 to 
be (U, R)-realizable, we can establish the (U, R)-realizability of other forms of CT not 
so trivial in the present context. 
12.2. Theorem. Suppose A(x, a), ,4(x, z) are formulas containing no occurrence of 
w and no free variables other than those shown. The following closed versions of CT are 
provable in S*, using CONT!, and hence by nonconstructive argument are (U, R)- 
realizable. 
CCT,!: Vx3!zA(x, z) -+ 3r(LL(r) A VxA(x, z(x))), 
CCT,!: Vxx3!aA(x, a) + %(LL(z) A VxA(x, lyz((x, y)))). 
Proof. CCTl ! is obtained first by a straightforward computation of Giidel number 
from the Giidel number given by CONT!. CCTe! then follows from CCTr !. 0 
This leaves open the status of the corresponding schemes CTO! or CT1 ! containing 
free number variables but no o and no free sequence variables. 
Consider the following weak schemes with possible addiitonal free number vari- 
ables in A(x, z) or A(a). 
WCT,!: VxEl!zA(x, z) -+ 113eVx3y[T(e, x, y) A A(x, U(y)))], 
WCT,!: 3!aA(a) + 113a(LL(a) A A(a)). 
12.3. Theorem. WCTe! and WCTl ! are (U, R)-realizable. 
Proof. WCTl !: Use WCONT!. 0 
Versions dropping the uniqueness requirement on the left are: 
CCT,: Vx3zA(x, z) + 3eVx3y[T(e, x, y) A A(x, U(y))], 
CCT,: %xA(a) + 32 [LL(r) A A(z))], 
where A(a) contains no w and only free variable a, or corresponding CT0 or CT1 
allowing number parameters. 
In S2 an instance of CCTr is refutable. For, 3x1 M,(a) is provable in SZ (Theorem 
10.2). Letting A(a) be lLL(cr) in CCTl we get a contradiction. 
We can also establish the non-( U, R)-realizability of the version of V’a3fi-continuity 
which fails to postulate uniqueness of j? but demands a lawlike map; i.e. the scheme 
CONT-LL: Vc+A(a,/?) --* %{LL(r) A v’avtt!yyt(2’+‘*%(y)) > 0 A 
V’aVj?[V’t3yr(2’f1 *or(y)) = b(t) + 1 + A(a, /I)]}, 
where A (a, /?) may be restricted to contain no w and no free variables beyond a and /I. 
For, the unrealizable CCTr is a consequence of CONT-LL, putting A(B) for A(a, j?). 
For systems SZ and S*, there is a refutable instance of CONT-LL. 
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Another consequence of the failure of CCTi is that we cannot establish the 
(U, R)-realizability of Troelstra’s scheme of analytic data, at least in the straightfor- 
ward expression of that scheme in L*, namely: 
AD: A(a) + 3z [LL(z) A Vfl“z/j3 defined” A 3/I% = r//I” 
where A(cr) contains only a free (and no o) and “z/b defined” abbreviates 
V~x3!yr(2”+‘*p(y)) > 0; “IX = z/p” abbreviates VxVy(z(2”+‘*~(y)) > 0 -+ 
a(x) + 1 = 2(2x+1 *B(y))). 
For, CCTi can be deduced from AD as follows. Assume A(a), whence by AD, 
we can assume LL(z), V’p”z//l defined”, and V~V~(“Y = r/r + A(y)). Put 
/? = OX = A0At0, whence “r/Ot defined”. Assumed “y = z/Of”. With LL(r) we easily get 
LL(y). And by V- and -+ -elims, we also have A(y). 
These failures of CCTi, CONT-LL and AD are not surprising, because we have 
allowed lawless sequences, and these principles were formulated only for a theory of 
ordinary choice sequences. What is surprising, perhaps, is that so many other of the 
axioms of ordinary choice sequences have been realized without change or with 
minimal adjustment from those for ordinary choice sequences. 
Although the first two of these three principles are recovered if we insist on 
uniqueness in the hypothesis, it is not so easy to see how to recover a formal version of 
AD holding in our interpretation. A first intuition, suggested by our interpretation 
would be to let the /I on the right of AD above be replaced by a lawless /I. But this does 
not work; the resulting scheme is not (U, @-realizable. 
It may be that the insight validating AD is simply used differently in (U, R)- 
realizability, where the principle appears not in the formal language but on the 
metalevel, in the interpretation given to CL 
So far, we have reviewed some consequences of allowing both lawlike and lawless 
sequences. It is easy to see (Theorem 12.4) that we are allowing more, i.e. the existence 
of sequences which are neither lawlike nor lawless. 
But on the other hand, as Theorem 12.5 below shows, we recover in our interpreta- 
tion a striking property of the first form of ralizability (1945 or number realizability): 
the unrealizability of excluded middle for the “diagonal” predicate, i.e. the usual 
recursively enumerable but not recursive predicate ([8, Section 821). Putting this 
another way, our present interpretation does not allow the existence of arbitrary r.e. 
sequences. By contrast, Kleene’s function realizability of FIM invalidates excluded 
middle only for analytic predicates, and is unable to rule out the existence of arbitrary 
arithmetical sequences. Kleene does have versions of function realizability invalida- 
ting excluded middle for arithmetical predicates (which are complete r.e. and above) 
but these versions do not allow bar induction (FIM, p. 111 et seq.). 
12.4. Theorem. The sentence 3c~(1 LL(ix) A 1 LS(a)) is provable in S2 (and hence 
(U, H)-realizable for each recursively closed H). 
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Proof. In SZ let tl be defined for all x so that: a(2x) = 0(2x); 42x + 1) = 
1 + 0(2x + 1). Then for all x, w(x) = a(x), if x even; = a(x) 2 1, if x odd. It follows, 
doing some formal work with Giidel numbers, that if LL(a) then LL(w), contradicting 
Theorem 10.2. On the other hand, if M(M)) then we may assume z so 
Vi(i 2 lb(z) + a(i) = o(i)). But this easily contradicts the definition of CL IJ 
12.5. Theorem. (a) Suppose R(x) is the formula in L: 3z(T(x, x, z) A U(z) = 1) where 
T(x, y, z) and U(y) are as in Section 12.1. Then the following sentences A and B, 
formally equivalent in S2, are not (U, R)-realizable. Hence A and B are unprovable in 
S1. (b) In fact, using CCT 1 !, the sentences 1 A and 1 B are provable in S*. 
A: Vx(R(x) v 1 R(x)), 
B: 3aVx[~a(x) < 1 A ((a(x) = 0 A R(x)) v (Q(X) = 1 A 1 R(x)))]. 
Proof. The refutability result (b) is stronger, but since it depends on CCTl ! , whose 
realizability has only been established by a non-constructive argument, we state also 
the weaker result (a), which can be established constructively. 
We show only (b). Assuming B, which we abbreviate 3aVxC(a, x) we can easily 
deduce 3 ! aVxC(a, x), whence by CCTl !, we may assume 
(i) LL(z), 
(ii) Vx[z(x) < 1 A (((z(x) = 0 A R(x)) v (z(x) = 1 A 1 R(x)))]. 
Using (i) we may assume: 
(iii) Vx3y(T(e, x, y) A U(y) = z(x)). Also, we have for the T-predicate: 
(iv) VxVy[3zT(x, y, z) + 3!zT(x, y, z)]. (Section 6). 
Now (ii) and (iii) give 
VxIy[(T(e, x, y) A U(y) = 0 A 3z(T(x, x, z) A U(z) = 1)) 
v (T(e, x, y) A U(y) = 1 A 13z(T(x, x, z) A U(z) = l))]. 
Putting x = e and using (iv), we have a contradiction. Hence in S*: t 1 B, and thus 
also F-IA. 0 
13. Some open problems 
Questions remain, including: the status of particular postulates from the above 
systems, the formalization of the realizability proofs, the consequences of (U, H)- 
realizability with other U and H than considered above, alternative interpretations of 
intuitionistic concepts in these systems. 
13.1. Among questions about the postulates of these systems are these: 
(1) Is CONT! with number (but no sequence) parameters tronger than the version 
Theorem 9.5 of CONT! above, and if so, is this strengthened version (U, R)-realizable 
(either constructively or classically)? 
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(2) Is there a constructive proof of the (U, R)-realizability of CONT!? 
(3) Can a version of LS3 omitting either or both of the double negation prefixes be 
(U, H)-realized (for some U and H)? 
(4) Does LS3 (without LS4) contradict classical ogic? 
(5) Can either of CTO! or CTi! (with number parameters) be (U, R)-realized? 
13.2. Can we formalize in an appropriate system the proofs of (U, R)-realizability for 
the system SZ? Without a constructive proof of (U, R)-realizability of CONT! we 
could not hope to formalize in an intuitionistic system the realizability proof for S*. 
However, we might expect a formalization of the proof of (U, R)-realizability for the 
system SZ. 
One might seek a confirmation of the “projections model” thesis mentioned in the 
introduction. Thus one could place the constraint that in formalizing (U, R)-realiza- 
bility for S2 choice sequences be interpreted as projections by lawlike (recursive) 
functions of lawless ones. Essentially, one could require that U consist of the lawless 
sequences. The above informal proofs of (U, R)-realizability do not all meet this 
demand (cf. 10.6), but changes required are mostly trivial, save apparently for treat- 
ments of LS4 and CONT!. Those two axioms, however, are not standard ones of 
intuitionistic analysis. 
An interesting issue in this context is the metatheoretic use of bar induction, as in 
the proof of Lemma 3.24. Of course, the given proof is valid, even though there are 
sequence parameters in the predicate (as would not be allowed in our formal RBI), 
because the proof is given in a metatheory in which there are no lawless equences. But 
the proof for (U, R)-realizability should even be formalizable in a theory containing 
lawlike and lawless sequences, because then all the free variables Y would be lawlike, 
as allowed in RBI. 
13.3. A related question is what happens when other U and H are chosen for 
(U, H)-realizability. It might be expected that a significantly different interpretation 
would be obtained, for example, with U a fan, say the spread of 6’ < 1. However, 
this does not appear to be so. Other choices of H might also be considered. Certainly 
one obtains a hierarchy of (U, H)-realizabilities as H ranges through the 
sets of functions of each arithmetical degree, as in Kleene’s C/realizability of FIM, 
p. 111 et seq. 
Is it possible to obtain 1945realizability as a specialization of (U, H)-realizability 
for some U and H? 
13.4. It may be possible to reformulate the (U, H)-realizability definition to interpret 
lawlike sequences in the spirit of Troelstra-van Dalen [22], that is, as eventually 
constant functions in (N -+ N) + N. We have failed to find such a formulation that 
would preserve the crucial Lemma 3.24. 
It is also possible to give different formal interpretations of lawlessness. 
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13.5. One might also expect a topos theoretic version of the above interpretation, 
perhaps along the lines of Hyland [6]. This should provide additional insights, but in 
any case the present form of the interpretation has the advantages of more strongly 
emphasizing the role of the recursive functions and connecting directly with the 
earilier notions of realizability. 
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